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Prospects for Satisfactory Dispute Resolution
of Private Commercial Disputes
Under the North American
Free Trade Agreement
I. INTRODUCTION
"Laissez faire. Let business go forward. No interference."'
"World trade is poised at a critical juncture, when many societies are initiating
democracy. Open and fair trading systems like NAFTA demonstrate to the world
the way to future prosperity."'
"Essential to the smooth flow of international commerce is an efficient and
flexible method for settling disputes."'
Assume you own a small manufacturing business in Southern Califor-
nia. Being reasonably well-read, you note with interest the passage of
NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement. You learn that the
Agreement is intended to create greater opportunities for the American
businessman. You talk to a business consultant who introduces you to a
Mexican company named Piemix. Piemix is interested in your products,
and you are interested in obtaining sales in this new market. However,
you are uncertain about the laws of Mexico, and feel that should any-
thing go wrong, you would prefer to resort to an impartial authority.
Your business consultant advises you to include an arbitration clause in
your sales contract so that any disputes arising under the deal would be
handled in arbitration proceedings. Taking your consultant's advice, you
1. HUGii RAWSON & MARGARET MINER, TIlE NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 47 (1986) (quoting MARQUIS D' ARGENSON, MEMORIES, 1736, Vol. 5).
Though difficult to substantiate, the phrase "laissez faire" arguably originated in 1751
when then minister of finance of France, Jean Baptist Colbert, asked businessmen
how to promote business. Id. The businessmen replied, "Laissez-nous faire," roughly
"Let's us get on with it." Id. This phrase has come to stand for an ideal for the free
passage of goods. Id.
2. S. REP. No. 266, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1992).
3. H.R. REP. No. 501, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990).
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contract to provide 100 items to Piemix for $100,000, and you include an
arbitration clause in the contract.
After delivering half of the items, Piemix informs you that it will not
proceed with the deal and will not return the items delivered. Negotia-
tions fail, and you proceed to arbitration to resolve the dispute. You win
a final arbitral award and seek its enforcement in the United States.
Piemix, however, is a state-owned business, as opposed to a private com-
pany. Piemix asserts its immunity from jurisdiction in the courts of the
United States which precludes the enforcement of the arbitral award.'
This Comment addresses such hypothetical situations and the means
by which parties can avoid such problems under NAFTA. This Comment
first provides a general introduction to NAFTA, followed by a more spe-
cific discussion of the potential problem noted in the hypothetical. Sec-
tion II will discuss the current expansion of international trade and its
regulation through the use of trade agreements such as NAFTA.5 Section
III examines NAFTA in general and its impact on U.S.-Mexico relations in
particular. ' Section IV examines the use of international commercial
arbitration as a means of obtaining certainty in international business
transactions.! Section V discusses the provisions for private commercial
dispute settlement under NAFTA.' Finally, section VI will provide recom-
mendations and guidance for the private business person seeking to en-
gage in trade with Mexico."
On November 20, 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement
obtained final congressional approval, thus uniting the United States,
Canada, and Mexico into the "world's largest free-trade zone.""
4. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text for some examples of how such
problems can arise.
5. See infra notes 34-161 and accompany text.
6. See infra notes 162-219 and accompanying text.
7. See ii(fra notes 220-302 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 303-466 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 467-535 and accompanying text.
10. This Comment will focus primarily on the impact that NAFTA will have on
relations between the United States and Mexico. NAFrA incorporates most of the
existing provisions of the UNITED STATES - CANADA FREE TRADE AGItEEMENT. U.S. INT'L
TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2596, POTENTIAL IMPACT ON TIlE U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED
INDUSTRIES OF TIlE NORTHI AMERICAN FREE-TRADE A(;REEMENT (Jan. 1993), available in
WESTLAW, FINT-ITC Database [hereinafter POTENTIAL IMPACT.] NAFTA is expected to
have "minimal additional effects" on this relationship. Id.; see infra notes 153-61 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the UNITED STATES - CANADA FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT. "[Tihe principal effects of NAFTA" will be to change the United States -
Mexico relationship. POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra. Thus, this Comment will focus on the
relationship that will be most apt to change from NAFTA. For a description of how
a typical pre-NAFrA sales transaction might have proceeded for an American seller in
Mexico, see Eduardo Siqueiros, Legal Framework for the Sale Qf Goods Into Mexico,
12 IIotis. J. INT'L L. 291, 304-14 (191)0).
11. Helen Dewar, NAFTA Wins Final Congressional Test, WASII. POST, Nov. 21,
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Though intensely debated," NAF7A "really does a very simple thing;" it
eliminates, over time, tariffs and nontariff barriers' among the afore-
mentioned countries. NAFTA creates a market of 370 million people with
$6.5 trillion in production.'4 This market combines abundant natural re-
sources with technological advancement. With the passage of NAFTA,
the United States signaled that it is prepared to participate and compete
in the global market." Furthermore, NAFTA solidifies the gains in inter-
1993, at Al. The Senate approved this "historic trade agreement" by a vote of 61 to
38. Id. The House of Representatives had previously approved the agreement on No-
vember 17, 1993 by a 234 to 200 vote. Kenneth J. Cooper, House Approves U.S. -
Canada - Mexico Trade Pact on 234 to 200 Vote, Giving Clinton Big Victory, WASi.
POST, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al. NAFTA became effective on January 1, 1994. Id. "This
Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 1994, on an exchange of written noti-
fications certifying the completion of necessary legal procedures." North American
Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1994, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 22, art. 2203, 107 Stat. 2123
[hereinafter "NAFTA").
12. Although this Comment will not specifically address the contentions of those
opposed to NAFTA, it should be noted that NAFrA is not set in stone. All that is re-
quired to withdraw from NAFTrA is notice and six months. "A Party may withdraw
from this Agreement six months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to the
other parties." NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 2205.
13. NAFTA embodies "free trade, not economic union." Harry Stainer, Sovereignty
is Safe, Trade Official Says, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 13, 1992, at 4B (quoting William H.
Cavitt, Director of Canada Office in U.S. Department of Commerce). The participating
countries merely agree to free trade. There is no concomitant reduction of sovereign-
ty by adoption of an economic union as illustrated by the European Community. Id.;
see infra note 133 and accompanying text for a discussion of the European Commu-
nity.
14. Editorial, For the Record, WASI. POST, Sept. 24, 1993, at A22 (hereinafter Edi-
toriall. NAF'rA, a "key to new job creation and economic growth," allows the United
States to compete in a global market. Id. See iitfra notes 34-60 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the global marketplace. NAFTA also allows an increased
competitive edge against other regional trading areas, particularly Europe and Japan.
Editorial, supra. See intfra notes 129-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of
regional trading blocs. NAFTA also provides a stepping stone into the vast market of
Central and South America, which contains 400 million people. Editorial. supra. See
infra notes 203-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of entry into Latin Ameri-
can markets.
15. Mario L. Baeza, Benefits to the United States Business and Financial Commu-
nities From a North American Free Trade Agreement, 643 PLI/CoMM 259 (1992). See
also DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO 1 (Edward L. Newberger ed. 1974).
16. Alan Murray, The Outlook: NAFTA Win is Crucial To Asia Talks Success,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1993, at Al. Passage of NAF'A was particularly important as it
was a "highly visible sign" of the path that the United States would follow in the
post Cold-War world. Id.
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national trade already realized by the participating countries." Accord-
ingly, NAFI'A will create enumerable benefits for all of its parties."
NAFTA attempts to benefit American business by increasing business
opportunities through increased international trade. The agreement will
arguably have the greatest benefit to "small and medium-sized companies
that are experiencing the fastest export growth."' Some commentators,
however, warn against assuming that NAFTA will be a panacea for small-
er-sized businesses."0 In an atmosphere where trade problems are likely,
17. NAFTA acts by "locking in the progress thus far achieved in . . . economic
relations, preventing sudden changes in national trade and investment policies." Juan
R. Espana, Impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on U.S.-
Mexican Trade and Investment Flows, 28 BUSINESS ECONOMICS 41, July 1993. NAFV'A
accomplishes this by adding an "element of predictability" to economic relations be-
tween the countries. Id.; see also Carla A. Hills, Address Before the Senate Finance
Committee (Sept. 8, 1992), in The North American Free Trade Agreement: A Promise
Fulfilled, 3 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 697, Sept. 12, 1993 (stating that the United
States is competing successfully with Mexico already).
18. NAFTA is expected to "eliminate irrational and wasteful trade barriers, boost
economic growth, reduce consumer prices, raise living standards, foster political sta-
bility and reform in Mexico and diminish illegal immigration into the United States."
Stephen Chapman, A Green Bogeyman Causes Unfounded Fear of NAFTA, Ciii. TRilB.,
July 4, 1993, at 3C. Various studies of NAFTA indicate a "surprising degree of una-
nimity" in the belief that NAF'rA will create jobs and wage gains in the United
States. Overview, The North American Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 1992. 1992 WL
239304 (N.A.F.T.A.) [hereinafter Overview: NAFTAI. See, e.g., CLINTON R. SHIELLS &
ROBERT C. SIHELBURNE, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2508, ECONOMY-WIDE MOD-
ELING OF TIHE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF A FrA WITH! MEXICO AND A NAFT'A WIT1l
CANADA AND MEXICO (May 1992), available in WESTLAW, FINT-ITC database.
19. Hills, supra note 17. By removing trade barriers, smaller firms can sell their
products and/or services in Mexico without having to build facilities in Mexico, a
cost many such businesses could not undertake. Report of the Administration on the
NAFIA and Actions Taken in Fulfillment of the May 1, 1991 Committees. Sept. 18.
1992, 1992 WL 360154 (N.A.F.T.A.) [hereinafter Report of the Administration on
NAFTA].
20. "NAFTA is being sold as the gold rush of the '90s ... [yet] anyone smaller
than Chevron or GM is going to have to fight a 10-year legal battle" should any dis-
putes arise while engaging in trade with Mexico. Jack Andersen & Michael Binstein,
Doing Business in Mexico: The Big Payoff 'The Court of Last Resort Can Often Be
A Corrupt Cop of a Graft-Seeking Judge,' WAsII. POST, Sept. 20, 1992, at C7. This
article indicates smaller businesses must consider the substantial risks of doing busi-
ness with Mexico, even in light of NAFTA. Id. The authors focus on a dispute an
American businessman, Jack Andrews, had with Andsa, the Mexican government's
food storage monopoly. Id. After eight years and two default judgements for $2 mil-
lion. Andrews has yet, to collect any money. Id. The authors note "the lack of an
effective arbitration mechanism for disputes between American companies and the
government-sponsored monopolies in Mexico." Id.
Even with passage of NAFTA, most attorneys believe "settlement of business
disputes between private firms will remain a problem." Dianne Solis, In Mexico, A
Dispute Over a Business Deal May Land You In Jail, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1993, at
1316
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the risks of doing business in Mexico under NAFTA remain sizable for
small and medium-sized businesses..2' A successful NAFTA requires ef-
fective dispute resolution procedures to handle such eventualities."' The
call for increased international trade cannot be sustained without en-
forcement of the agreements which fuel the heightened trade." The lack
of adequate dispute settlement procedures can result in "serious prob-
lems with the implementation of the obligations in NAFTA.-"
2 1
Al. Ms. Solis indicates how disputes have arisen due to the statutory protection pro-
vided by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Id. She notes how U.S. busi-
nessman Robert Gough initiated suit in a federal court in Houston against Petroleos
Mexicanos (PEMEX), the national oil company of Mexico, to obtain payment on four
valves that had been provided by his company, Tubular U.S.A. Inc. Id. Although the
court held that PEMEX was culpable, it found the company shielded from a suit by
the FSIA. Id. "In short, Pemex could act like a business, but when it pleased, it
could claim a sort of governmental status." Id. See i7fra notes 398-99 and accompa-
nying text for discussion of the FSIA.
21. For example, consider the situation of Texas businessman Bill Flanigan. Tod
Robberson, Mexico's New Image Still Needs Focusing, Say Foreign Businessmen,
WAsii. POST, Nov. 6, 1992, at A21. Flanigan brought suit against PEMEX for violation
of the United States RICO act. Id. Flanigan obtained two successive judgements, but
has not been able to collect. Id. He pursued a $1 billion case against PEMEX in the
United States Supreme Court but was denied certiorari. Id. In eight years of pursuit
for a legal remedy, Flanigan has collected only about $1 million dollars. Solis, supra
note 20. See infra notes 426-42 and accompanying text for discussion of the Flanigan
case. See also Doing Business With Mexico. WASIL POST, Oct. 20, 1992, at A18 (fur-
ther examining problems encountered by American businessmen doing business in
Mexico); Tod Robberson, Mexico's Banking Afflicts Investors; Corruption Said To Be
Compounding Risk, WASt. POST, Apr. 30, 1993, at A35 (discussing abuses in Mexican
banking system affecting American businessmen).
22. Other agreements similar to NAFTA. such as the Canada - United States Free
Trade Agreement "could not exist without agreed dispute-resolution procedures."
Seymour J. Rubin, The Interest Group on Avoidance and Resolution of Interntional
Economic Disputes, 83 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PRoc. 152 (1989). See inJra notes 153-61
and accompanying text for discussion of Canada - United States Free Trade Agree-
ment. NAF'A acknowledges this concern in Chapter One under Article 102: "The
objectives of this Agreement . . . are to . .. create effective procedures for the im-
plementation and application of this Agreement, for its joint administration and for
the resolution of disputes .... " NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 102 (emphasis added).
23. President Clinton has stated: "We cannot ask businesses and their workers to
take the risks of doing business in the global marketplace unless we can guarantee
that agreements will be enforced," Michael Kantor, Trade Central to Americas Future
in the World, Address, in US DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, May 17, 1993, at 352(3).
24. North American Free Trade: Barriers in Free Trade Arising Fr'om DifJ'erences
in National Law, 86 Am. SocY INT'L L. Poc. 141 (1992) (Ursula Maria Odiaga, re-
porter) [hereinafter Barriers in Free Trade].
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NAFTA contains three major dispute resolution mechanisms.' This
Comment focuses solely on those provisions related to disputes arising
among the participating parties, and in particular disputes among private
commercial parties. Chapter 20 of NAFTA, entitled "Institutional Arrange-
ments and Dispute Settlement Procedures," contains such provisions.'
Articles 2003 to 2019 in Section B of this chapter provide the mechanism
for the resolution of disputes arising among the member countries."
Private commercial disputes may also be resolved through these provi-
sions, provided that the dispute involves a large, multinational company,
with enough economic clout to apply pressure on the particular govern-
mental entity involved in the dispute.' Yet, under NAFTA, smaller busi-
nessmen without the requisite clout seem "left out in the cold,"' as
NAFTA does relatively little to empower small and medium-sized busi-
nesses to effectively resolve their own commercial trade disputes.'
25. Gary N. Horlick & F. Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA:
Building on the U.S.-Canada FTA, GATT and ICSID, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 21. In
Chapter 11, NAFTA presents the relevant mechanisms for resolving investor disputes.
Chapter 19 deals with disputes arising due to antidumping and countervailing duty
matters. In Chapter 20, NAFTA provides the mechanism for resolving party disputes.
Id. For a concise outline of the relevant provisions of each chapter, see Kenneth P.
Freiberg et al., Dispute Settlement Under the North American Free Trade Agreement,
in MEXICO-INVESTMENT AND TRADE: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS (PLI Commercial Law &
Practice Handbook Series 1993).
26. NAFTA, supra note 11, ch. 20. Chapter 20 was modeled after Chapter 18 of
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. Horlick & Debusk, supra note 25, at
34. NAFTA's Chapter 20 provisions can be utilized instead of GATT dispute resolution
provisions. Id. See infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of
GATT.
27. NAFrA, supra, note 11, arts. 2003-19. Very generally the provisions provide for
the following:
The countries would try to solve any complaint through negotiations. If that
didn't work, a panel of experts from the three countries would evaluate the
complaint. The government would have 60 days to enforce its laws if the
complaint was found to be valid. If that didn't happen, the panel would have
60 days to come up with its own enforcement plan and levy a fine of as
much as $20 million.
Asra Q. Nomani & Dianne Solis, NAFTA Is Facing Difficult Trial In the Congress,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1993, at A3. Chapter 20 only operates upon request by "the three
national governments." Horlick & Debusk, supra note 25, at 35. Chapter 2 of NAFTA
contains the general definitions for words and phrases utilized in the text, and though
"Party" is not defined therein, it is clear from a reading of NAFI'A that "Party" refers
to the national governments of Canada, the United States of America, and Mexico.
28. Andersen & Binstein, supra note 20.
29. Id. "NAFTA doesn't deal with private-party-to-private-party disputes" stated Jul-
ius Katz, NAFTA's chief negotiator under the Bush administration. Solis, supra note
20.
30. Wayne I. Fagan & Carlos Gabuardi Arreola, The Arbitration of Private Com-
mercial Disputes Between Residents of Texas and Mexico. 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 803,
1318
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Only a single article, Article 2022 advocates the use of arbitration and
other methods of dispute resolution in international trade disputes."
Among private parties NAFTA does not add anything substantive to the
field of private commercial dispute settlement, relying instead on com-
mercial dispute conventions already in existence.' The 'relevant NAFrA
provisions designed to resolve private commercial disputes do not appear
to fully advance the objectives of United States trade policy with respect
to smaller businesses engaging in international trade.'
817 (1993).
31. Article 2022, in Chapter 20 of NAFTA provides in part:
1. Each Party shall, to the maximum extent possible, encourage and facilitate
the use of arbitration and other means of alternative dispute resolution for
the settlement of international commercial disputes between private parties in
the free trade area.
2. To this end, each Party shall provide appropriate procedures to ensure the
observance of agreements to arbitrate and for the recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards in such disputes.
3. A Party shall be deemed to be in compliance with paragraph 2 if it is a
party to and is in compliance with the 1958 United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or the 1975
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.
NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 2022.
32. The 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards and the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration. NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 2022, § 3. See infra notes 270-
302 and accompanying text for a discussion of above two Conventions.
33. Title 15 of the United States Code Annotated. Commerce and Trade, provides:
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Federal Government ...
should aid and assist small businesses ... to increase their ability to com-
pete in international markets by ... ensuring that the interests of small busi-
nesses are adequately represented in bilateral and multilateral trade negotia-
tions.
15 U.S.C. § 631(b)(1) (1988).
Thus, Congress has formally recognized the need to provide for smaller businesses
in trade treaties, such as NAFTA. Part of adequately providing for small business en-
tails adopting effective dispute settlement procedures for international trade. Title 19 of
the United States Code Annotated provides in part: "The principal [trade] negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to dispute settlement are ... to provide
for more effective and expeditious dispute settlement mechanisms and proce-
dures .... ." 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1988). NAFTA negotiators stated the individual
businessman was consulted as NAFTA involved "the most extensive ...private sector
consultations ever undertaken in connection with trade negotiation." Report of the Ad-
ministration on NAFTA, supra note 19.
Yet, NAFTA, at over 1000 pages in length, has only one article dealing with pri-
vate commercial disputes. A simple comparison of volume of text would indicate that
1319
II. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE AGREEMENTS
A. International Trade and the U.S Perspective in General
International trade has been the centerpiece for the development of
many nations and cultures in the past. ' Though well-documented, the
numerous advantages of international trade are outside the scope of this
Comment. This Comment relies on a single fundamental premise of inter-
national free trade, that of comparative advantage. When nations are al-
lowed to specialize in the production of goods and then exchange such
goods, there occurs a maximizing of the "welfare of nations participating
in that trade."" This premise remains valid despite newly advanced the-
ories of economics. However, in today's increasingly complex world,
some argue that a more subtle doctrine has replaced this "theology of
free trade" as "holy economic writ." '7 This modern doctrine rejects free
the United States, in negotiating NArFTA, did not fully consider the interests of smaller
businesses.
34. GILBERT R. WINIIAM, TiIE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 5-10
(1992). Trade enhanced state development by increasing "state revenue and state
power." Id. at 6. Athens, Egypt, the Italian city states of Venice, Florence, and Genoa
all greatly increased their power through international trade. Id. at 6-7.
35. Id. at 9. See also Sharon D. Fitch, Dispute Settlement Under the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement: Will the Political, Cultural and Legal Differences Between
The United States and Mexico Inhibit the Establishnent of Fair Dispute Settlement
Procedures, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 353, 355-56 (1992). Comparative advantage embodies
the principle that "if every country concentrates on the production of goods and
services that it can produce relatively more efficiently than other countries, national
and world living standards will be maximized." JOHN CRISPo, FREE TRADE: TIlE REAL
STORY 2 (1988). The importance of this concept to world trade remains "unassailable."
Id. In fact, the Greek philosopher Plato understood this concept long ago when he
stated:
[Miore things will be produced and the work be more easily and better done,
when every man is set free from all other occupations to do, at the right
time, the one thing for which he is naturally fitted.
PLATO, TIlE REPUBLIC 57 (Francis M. Conford trans. 1941). One commentator argued
that the concept of comparative advantage applies directly to NAFrA: "Failure to im-
plement NAFTA would mean giving up a unique opportunity to move both economies
to a higher level of efficiency and welfare." Espana, supra note 17.
36. WINIIAM, supra note 34, at 9. However, others argue that such ideas are "his-
torically interesting," yet totally irrelevant in addressing modern trade under "condi-
tions totally different" from those existing when such theories were first developed.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Free Trade Fetish Things l1ave Changed Since David
Ricardo's Time, WASh. POST, Sept. 14, 1992, at A15. These opponents to free trade
believe the mobility of capital and the presence of "global" corporations have dra-
matically changed the international trade landscape, thus making such theories inap-
plicable at present. Id. These critics would not examine the positive implications of
NAVI'A on a large scale, that is as to the aggregate benefits to the relevant countries
involved, but rather would focus on individuals, those "people in their daily lives in
all three countries." Id.
37. R.C. Longworth, U.S. Doing About Face on Trade, C111. TRIB., Mar. 21, 1993,
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trade as an unattainable objective, preferring to embrace the concept
that United States trade policy should further United States interests.:'
The ideal of supporting pure free trade would defer to an active, man-
aged trade policy, thus allowing the United States to compete successful-
ly with Europe and Japan.:'
However, under either a pure free trade or managed trade perspective,
increasing world trade means the creation of wealth for participant coun-
tries.4" The striving for creation of national wealth via international trade
seems to have supplanted most other contemporary governmental con-
cerns.4" For the United States, further growth in international trade has
enormous repercussions because the ability of the United States to grow
economically has become "closely tied" to our ability to compete in the
world market.42 To remain a dominant player on the world scene the
United States must take a prominent role in promoting world trade."'
(Business) at 1.
38. Id.
39. In fact, a large degree of NAFI'A's appeal lies in the argument that it allows
the "United States to be competitive with Europe and Japan." Senators Press USTR
Kantor On Canadian Whieat; Urge Action, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 16, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database. In an interesting twist, the concept of
.managed trade" that Latin American countries have recently abandoned has begun to
"emerge as part of official U.S. economic doctrine, itself a reaction to similar policies
practiced by the Japanese and Europeans." Moises Naim, Latin America: Post-Adjust-
ment Blues, FOREIGN POLIcY 133 (Fall 1993). See infra notes 203-19 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of Latin America trade. This move towards managed trade has
been steady for the past two decades. WINIIAM, supra note 34. at 109.
40. Longworth, supra note 37, at 9.
41. "The principal challenge now facing the United States is to compete in a rapid-
ly changing and expanding global marketplace." North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCl, Aug. 17, 1992, at 641(4). With the Cold War over,
the United States must now focus on economic concerns to retain a position of pow-
er in the new world order. Id.; see also Jonathan Peterson, The New Cash Diploma-
cy: The Next Ptesident's Foreign Policy Will Be Based on Economics, Not Idealogy,
L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1992, (World Report) at 5 (noting that economic concerns will
likely compete with military concerns in forming United States foreign policy). Contra
WINIIAM, supra note 34, at 3 (noting "crisis and war" remain dominant concerns in
the international arena, while economics and trade remain recessive).
42. White House Fact Sheet on NAFTA, Bus. Am.. Aug. 24. 1992, at 22. In 1991.
exports accounted for 7.5 million United States jobs, and of these, 2.1 million were
supported by exports to Canada and Mexico, the other trading partners in NAFTA.
Id.
43. Thomas E. Stewart, The New Face of American Power, FORTUNE, July 26, 1993,
at 70. The demise of the Soviet Union and the attendant military threat means Ameri-
can military might have less use and meaning. Id.
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Such a position of leadership must become the new goal of United States
foreign policy.' President Clinton has adopted this view, stating that
"[f]or now and for the foreseeable future the world looks to us to be the
engine of global growth and to be the leaders."" The President has
warned about the potential adverse consequences of looking inward,
while other countries move forward in exploiting the benefits of a newly
emerging world economy."
With the diminished threat of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold
War, and less focus on military concerns, it is an ideal time for the Unit-
ed States to focus on promoting international trade and a new world or
der based on mutually advantageous trade. Yet, interest in promoting
such a system has "wan[ed] in country after country, including the Unit-
ed States."47 Rather than demonstrating an active interest in promoting
free trade, the United States has moved toward the "strongest protection-
ist sentiment in years.""
44. Thomas Stewart argues that foreign policy should strive for "integration" such
that:
It can be America's mission to lead the process of forging links among na-
tions that are stronger than the forces that estrange them; to help commerce
and capital flow freely; to offer all nations reasonable confidence that gains
from free riding or rogue behavior will not stand; and to pursue these goals
wherever and whenever the chance arises.
Id.
However, it is questionable whether the United States can unilaterally compel such
free trade since it is unlikely that the United States can "control the outcome" of such
decisions. Peterson, supra note 41, at 5. Though perhaps the "biggest" player in the
global marketplace, the United States is now one of many and cannot dictate its will
as it perhaps did in the past. Id.
45. Trade Central to America's Future in the World, 4 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCi,
May 17, 1993, at 352(3). President Clinton appears committed to adapting to a global
economy and realizes that international trade has become a necessity in the new
world order
Today our challenges are dynamic, not static. Economic strength, founded on
human resources and nourished by trade, is a pillar of national security in
this new Post-Cold War age. Our security interests-and those of others-are
inextricably linked to the growth and fairness of the global trading system.
Id.
46. President Urges Grass Roots Support For NAFTA, Encourages Write-In Cam-
paign, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 16, 1993. By not taking advantage of internation-
al trade, United States economic growth and job creation will decline. Id.
47. The forces that once bound countries together have lessened. Jim Hoagland.
The Turn Toward Isolation, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1993, at A23. Sharing a common
concern of military threat and benefiting from an ever-expanding "global pie of trade
and investment," nations naturally cooperated. Id. However, with a diminished military
threat, the pie has stopped increasing, and the new "game" involves trade rivalries
among the industrial powers. Id.
48. U.S. Trade Negotiations, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1993, at B6. Some point out that
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The contradictions inherent in world trade have fueled these protec-
tionist views." Promoting free world trade has already increased the
wealth of some nations; now, these nations have become "decreasingly
tolerant" of change, whenever change means increased competition from
nations which have yet to benefit.' The nations that have already bene-
fitted from world trade want to maintain the status quo and the wealth
they now enjoy. Many nations, the United States included, now attach
an "array of economic and social uncertainties" on global trade. 2 The
United States' has attempted to maintain an advantage in trade with
Mexico; a general Mexican perception holds that "there has been a past
pattern of the United States increasing trade barriers whenever Mexico
becomes competitive in a particular industry.""
Yet, the ideal of free trade remains a fundamental principle of United
States policy. This principle is codified in a variety of statutes.' The
the vigorous effort needed to pass NAFrA indicates that the "whole notion of reduc-
ing trade barriers is in serious trouble." Henry F. Myers, Free-Trade Idea Needs A
Dominant Champion, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1993, at Al.
49. George F. Will, NAFTA and the Great Wall of Fear, WAsI. POST, Sept. 26,
1993, at C7.
50. Id. The forces leading to this view are numerous: slowing growth of the
world's major economies, increasing competition from developing countries, excess
capacity in most industries on a global scale, and the resulting political frictions
caused by weak job markets. Myers, supra note 48, at Al.
51. Stewart, supra note 43, at 70. Four of the richest nations in the
world-France, Germany, Britain, and Japan-have all vehemently protested increased
competition. Id. This merely reflects the "long history of mixed messages" received
by the developing countries. Tim Carrington, Developed Nations Want Poor Countries
To Succeed on Trade, But Not Too Much, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1993, at AlO. The in-
dustrialized countries first call for liberalized economies for the third world: privatize
industries, limit state subsidies, and remove barriers to imports. Id. However, should
these reforms create too strong an economy, the industrialized world responds with
barriers to the developing countries exports. Id. "[Tihe industrialized nations want
their poorer counterparts to succeed, but not too much." Id.
52. Bob Davis & Jackie Calmes, NAFTA's Odds Improve, But U.S. May Reduce Its
Trade Leadership, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1993, at Al.
53. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2275, REVIEW OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT
LIBERALIZATION MEASURES BY MEXICO AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE UNITED
STATES--MEXICAN RELATIONS (Apr. 1990) available in WESTLAW, FINT-ITC Database
[hereinafter TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES].
54. Various United States Code sections embrace free trade. Section 2901 of Title
19, outlining trade objectives for the United States provides in part:
The overall trade negotiating objectives of the United States are to obtain-
(1) more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access;
(2) the reduction or elimination of barriers and other trade-distorting policies
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benefits of international trade remain manifest, and increasing interna-
tional trade has become the rule rather than the exception.' The Presi-
dent must always remain committed to advancing international trade or
be ready for the adverse impact of diminishing world trade.' The Presi-
dent must understand the complexity of the modern world in which the
United States participates."7 This belief is not exclusive to those in high
positions, but arguably is well understood by the American people.'
and practices; and
(3) a more effective system of international trading disciplines and proce-
dures.
19 U.S.C. § 2901(a) (1988).
The ideal is presented even more forcefully in Section 631 of Title 15. dealing
with commerce and trade, and providing in part:
The essence of the American economic system of private enterprise is free
competition. Only through full and free competition can free markets, free
entry into business, and opportunities for the expression and growth of per-
sonal initiative and individual judgement be assured. The preservation and
expansion of such competition is basic not only to the economic well-being
but to the security of this Nation.
15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
55. This notion has even reached the United States judicial system, as the Supreme
Court has acknowledged the prevalence of international trade. Chief Justice Burger, in
addressing the applicability of a forum selection clause in an international trade con-
tract, noted a two decade long "expansion of overseas commercial activities." M/S
Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1. 8 (1972). This observation would coin-
cide with the trade liberalization that has occurred since the passage of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. See infra notes 97-112 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of GATT. Noting that American business seeks opportu-
nities "in all parts of the world" and thus operates globally, the Court had to face
.commercial realities and expanding international trade" to properly resolve the issue
at hand. M/S Bremen. 407 U.S. at 11-12, 15. The net effect of the movement towards
global trading is that "[aill countries are now recognizing that industrial competitive-
ness can only be achieved through access to international markets, with the result
that governments - as well their industries - have now entered the race for external
markets." WINHAM, supra note 34, at 114.
56. Some have noted that when pressure is exerted against international trade, the
normally present sense of cooperation vanishes, resulting in adverse consequences.
Hoagland, supra note 47, at A23. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text for
discussion of the most dramatic i)eriod of adverse consequences under the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act. In fact, history has shown that sometimes it takes "trade wars" to
reestablish the benefits of cooperation in the first place. lloagland, supru note 47, at
A23. But see Myers, supra note 48, at Al (warning that no one is so dominant as to
impose free trade). See also Davis & Calmes, supra note 52, at Al. The movement of
trade liberalization "has been slowed sharply and may be headed for reversal." Id.
57. See generally Richard C. Breeden, The Globoliza tion of Law and Business in
the 1990's, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509 (1993).
58. It has been expressed that "the American people understand that they are
living in the modern world and that a globalized trading system is both beneficial
and inevitable." Review and Outlook: Halloween for NAF7A, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9,
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Some argue that open international trade is in fact a kind of hallmark of
the American character.'r The passage of NAFTA signaled that the Unit-
ed States was willing to participate in the global marketplace, and act ac-
cording to its own ideals of free trade and open competition.'
B. Trade Agreements
In examining the implications of NAFTA, it is first necessary to deter-
mine the role that international trade agreements play in world trade
generally." Trade agreements have naturally developed as trade among
differing groups increased.' These agreements arose as nations attempt-
ed to bring certainty into international transactions and to promote their
1993, at A20.
59. The 1992 Joint Economic Report stated:
A proclivity for leadership in the American character results in a natural re-
luctance to engage in protectionism, even as political opportunists sell it as a
cure-all for increasingly stiff international competition. The openness of Amer-
ican society means that actual attempts to protect beleaguered American
industries are often inept.
S. REP. No. 266, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1992).
60. Rejection of NAFI'A would have signalled that the United States had turned
.protectionist." Robert Keatley, If NAFTA Fails, Negative Repercussions Could Reach
Far Beyond North America, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1993, at A4. In fact, rejection
would have severely limited the United States ability to conduct any "serious econom-
ic foreign policy." Id. But see James M. Sheehan, NAFTA - Free Trade in Name
Only, WALL ST. J., Sept, 9, 1993, at A21. Sheehan proposes that NAFTA, with all its
limitations and wording, is not truly an adoption of free trade. Id. "Free trade should
be simple . . . . Hopelessly complex trade agreements that restrict free exchange are
not repaired by the presence of free trade rhetoric. NAFTA's proponents are inspired
more by what they hope it could be than by what it really is." Id. Accord Noam
Chomsky, 'The Masters of Mankind': Notes on NAFTA, NATION, Mar. 29, 1993, at 412.
Chomsky argues that NAFTA has "only a limited relation to free trade." Id. He ar-
gues that NAFTA is drafted in such a way as to "keep the wealth and power firmly
in the hands" of the industrialized nation, in this case the United States. Id. He fur-
ther argues that the industrialized nations claim to want free trade and to help the
poor countries, but in fact employ protectionist measures that have caused the "gap"
between the rich and poor countries to have doubled since 1960. Id. The use of this
protectionist measures "reduce income in the South by about twice the amount of
official aid to the region." Id. This trend is likely to continue as, in the past decade,
the rich countries have actually increased protectionism. Id.
61. WINILIN, supra note 34, at 4.
62. Id. at 4-5. The origins of trade agreements parallels that of trade in general,
and as such, "came very early, and is far older than any other contact among remote
groups that can now be traced." Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
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own interests.I Although trade agreements had modest beginnings as
"simple undertakings" among groups as to how commercial transactions
would proceed,' these agreements now represent the culmination of
years of negotiating, are vastly more complex, and cover all conceivable
scenarios of international trade.' Trade agreements, such as NAFTA
and The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),"' comprise
some of the most advanced agreements between countries."' Most signif-
icantly, the proliferation of international trade agreements has estab-
lished a "framework for the rules governing international trade and inter-
national finance."' These agreements embody the closest thing to "legis-
lation" in the international context.0 '
1. Trade Agreements Under United States Law
Treaties" made by the United States are expressly deemed to be the
"supreme Law of the Land" by Article VI of the Constitution.7' Trade
63. WINIIAM, supra note 34, at 17. See also Fitch, supra note 35, at 353.
Trade between different areas of the world has occurred throughout history
to the mutual advantage of the participants. In an effort to encourage such
trade, nations have entered into international agreements that established the
ground rules and parameters under which the various aspects of trade be-
tween the individual nations were to be conducted.
Id.
64. WINHAAM, supra note 34, at 15.
65. Upon release by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
NAFTA text checked in at a weighty 1,100 pages with an accompanying 900 page
tariff schedule. NAFTA National Treatment, MFN Rules May Apply to Tax Measures
in Only Limited Cases, BNA INT'L FIN. DAILY, Sept. 21, 1992.
66. See inifra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
67. The NAIFTA text has been variously described as "massive" and a "2,000-page
tome." Sheehan, supra note 60.
68. RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, Part III, Introductory Note, at
144 (1987). In fact, the law of international agreements has had as much significance
in the international law realm as the law of contracts has in the domestic context.
Id. at 147. International agreements, such as NAIFTA, form a "principal source of
international law." Id. at 144. However, comparisons to contract law should remain
limited, as the law of international agreements and contract law have fundamental
differences. Id. at 147. Therefore, a concept familiar and applicable in domestic con-
tract law may find little support in "international law where there is often no effec-
tive means of third party dispute resolution." Id. (emphasis added).
69. DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 729 (4th ed.
1991).
70. Defined broadly, a treaty merely indicates "any agreement between nations."
JACKSON H. RALSTON, TIE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 5 (1926).
Under this definition, NAFTA is a treaty.
71. Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
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agreements, as international agreements of the United States, become the
law of the United States and are supreme over state law.72 By their very
nature, trade agreements have significant impact on the United States
and are a matter of international concern.73 Participation in a trade
agreement like NAFTA carries an internationally recognized commitment;
such an agreement places considerable obligations on all participating
countries." As a result, treaties and international agreements have be-
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2 (emphasis added).
Cf. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937). In Behnont, Justice
Sutherland stated:
Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without
regard to state laws or policies . . . . And while this rule in respect of trea-
ties is established by the express language of clause 2, Art. VI of the Con-
stitution, the same rule would result in the case of all international compacts
and agreements from the very fact that complete power over international
affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any
curtailment or interference on the part of the several states . . . . In respect
of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign
relations generally, state lines disappear.
Id. Thus, supremacy of United States treaties is given not only by Article VI, but by
the exclusive authority the United States has in the international sphere.
72. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1) (1987). International
agreements remain subject to the Constitution and cannot be given effect in violation
thereof; however, an international agreement carries a strong responsibility, and the
United States will be held accountable under international law to honor the agree-
ment even if the agreement is deemed unconstitutional under United States law. Id.
at cmt. a.
73. Much of the opposition to NAFTA stemmed from an idea that passage of
NAFTA, as an international agreement, would impose responsibilities and obligations
that would nm counter to domestic policy. For example, the House proposed Resolu-
tion 246 when concerns arose over the impact that future international trade agree-
ments would have on "U.S. health, safety, labor, and environmental laws." H.R. REP.
No. 635 (II), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (992). This Resolution arose in reaction to an
adverse decision by a GATT panel in mid-1991. Id. Mexico had brought an action
against the United States, asserting the United States embargo on Mexican tuna was
contrary to GATT. Id. The United States had imposed the embargo, claiming that
Mexico was violating the United States Marine Mammal Protection Act, partly de-
signed to protect dolphins. Id. The GATT panel ruled against the United States and
found the United States in violation of GATT by holding that United States laws "to
protect the life or health of humans, animals, or plants could not be applied
'extrajurisdictionally.'" Id.
74. A treaty is "a solemn compact between nations. It possesses the same essential
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come the primary source for creating and enforcing obligations in the
international trading field.7'
2. United States Trade Regulation
The regulation of international trade has always been of fundamental
significance to the United States. The nation has always recognized the
importance of establishing a well balanced international trade policy."6
The United States determined that a coordinated trading policy was re-
quired as a "response to ... trading breakdowns and imbalances."77 The
federal government, specifically Congress, is vested with the power to
coordinate such a policy." The President also has significant powers to
affect the development of United States trade policy.'9 The most signifi-
cant of these powers is the President's power to enter into treaties."'
qualities as a contract between individuals, enhanced by the weightier quality of the
parties and by the greater magnitude of the subject-matter." RALSTON, supra note 70,
at 6. However, international agreements differ from contracts in that they "cannot be
enforced like domestic contracts." CRISPO, supra note 35, at 93. The effectiveness of
international agreements relies on nations honoring their international "obligations and
commitments." Id. However, a treaty will generally be interpreted in such a way so
as to give effect to the obligation contained therein. RALSTON, supra note 70, at 26.
75. EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, TIlE UNITED
STATES, AND TIlE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 6 (2d ed. 1986). International trade agreements
and their defined obligations are necessary for the orderly conduct of international
trade. Reliance on international law alone is not sufficient as it leaves "considerable
latitude" for each state to pursue different trading and economic objectives. Id.
76. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1988) (establishing an international trade expansion
program).
77. McGOVERN, supra note 75, at 6. The United States government appreciates that
tariff and nontariff barriers are an effective way to establish stability in the United
States economy.
[Dlislocations in national and international trade have motivated the federal
government to . . . revise tariff policies and applicable procedures ....
Congressional enactments . . . set forth programs and practices that provide
for greater or lesser access to domestic and foreign markets, as economic
conditions warrant [as] a response to those trading breakdowns and imbal-
ances.
Id.
78. The Constitution authorizes Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign na-
tions." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress has also been given express authority
to establish tariffs and duties on foreign goods. "The Congress shall have the Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties. Imposts and Excises .... " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 1.
79. The President enjoys three distinct types of power over foreign trade: "power
to regulate trade directly; power to achieve regulation by means of international
agreements; and power to influence trade by other means." McGOVERN, stpra note
75, at 66.
80. "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
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a. History of United States trade and trade regulation
Trade and trade agreements generally only take place if beneficial to
the member countries." For the entire international trading system to be
effective, nations must understand the long-term benefits of increasing
trade, as opposed to merely focusing on short-term gains."2 An examina-
tion of recent U.S trade and trade regulations will reveal the dramatic
changes that can occur as perspectives on international trade evolve.
i. Before and after The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)'l
"[P]rotectionism was the norm" in the early nineteenth century."
However, Britain had an "industrial head start" and thus actively pursued
free trade to sell its products.' Many countries followed this example,
and liberal trade agreements soon followed.' Yet, factors lead to a di-
minished interest in free trade, 7 which came to an end with the First
World War.'
make Treaties .... " U.S. CONsT. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The President also enjoys an
"implied power" to make international agreements by "executive agreement."
McGOVERN, supra note 75, at 68. The distinction between treaties and executive
agreements are peculiar to United States constitutional law; yet both bind the United
States on an international level. Id.
81. Myers, supra note 48, at Al. Myers notes "several common threads" which
weave throughout the history of international trade and highlight its cyclical nature:
(1) when a country is in a powerful position to pursue its own economic goals and
free trade enhances its ability to do so, then free trade will flourish, but (2) "when
the pressure of competition and of slow economic growth" weakens the country's
power, protectionist sentiments will return. Id.
82. Arthur Dunkel, Foreword to EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULA-
TION: GATT, TIlE UNITED STATES, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY V (2d ed. 1986) [here-
inafter Dunkel, Foreword]. Mr. Dunkel argues that nations will not respect the rules
contained in GATT unless "convinced that observance of the rules promotes national
and individual interests." Id.
83. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. October 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188
[hereinafter GATT].
84. Myers, supra note 48, at Al. At this time, many developed countries prohibited
the importation of competing country goods. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See supra note 81 and accompanying text describing cyclical nature of interna-
tional' trade.
88. Myers, supra note 48, at Al.
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After World War I, tariffs were raised with "disastrous results."' In
America, the protectionist sentiment reached its zenith with passage of
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930.'" This Act represented the final step in
the "long movement of nations to close off their economies to foreign
imports.""' As a result of retaliatory moves by other countries, world
trade fell by two-thirds by the mid 1930s.'
President Roosevelt began the movement to liberalize United States
trade policy.' At this time, similar to Britain in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the United States was in a unique position to benefit from free
world trade.' After having greatly expanded its economic base during
World War II, it was the only nation able to "jumpstart" the world's econ-
omies as they sought to recover from the ravages of the war.": The peri-
od immediately following World War II resulted in the creation of a "new
regime" in trading.'
GATT embodies the major move toward establishing a new interna-
tional structure on trade. 7 The United States, as a major proponent of
GATT, can claim to be the "prime sponsor" of the free trade movement
occurring after World War IL' GATT arose to counter the protectionist
economic policies of the 1930s and 1940s.' The structure established
under GATT has constituted the "central elements" of international trade
89. 4 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, May 17, 1993, at 354.
90. The well-known Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was technically the Tariff Act of 1930
and is contained in Chapter 4 of Title 19 of the United States Code. The breadth of
this act was substantial, imposing tariffs on "[alil articles imported into the customs
territory of the United States from outside thereof." Revised Tariff Schedules, 19
U.S.C.A. § 1202(1) (West 1978).
91. WINHAM, supra note 34, at 19.
92. Id.
93. Myers, supra note 48, at Al.
94. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
95. Myers, supra note 48, at Al.
96. WINItAM, supra note 34, at 20.
97. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WOR.D TRADE AND TIlE LAW OF GATT (1969);
ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GAIf LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975);
KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970).
98. Review & Outlook: NAFTA Jitters in Europe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1993, at
A12. This article suggests that if NAFTA had been defeated, a strong message would
have been sent that the United States was altering its course of free trade. Id. Such
a new position would have had a "global" effect and would have seriously impeded
the role of GATT in the future. Id.
99. GATT was "[e]stablished to deal with high tariffs and discriminatory quotas, the
protectionist tools of choice in the 1930s and 1940s, [and] it was very successful."
Barriers in Free Trade, supra note 24, at 143. GATT's preamble notes a primary ob-
jective of "entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed
to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimina-
tion of discriminatory treatment in international commerce." GATT, supra note 83, at
189.
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for the past 40 years.' Referred to as the "paramount" treaty regulating
international trade in goods, GATT enjoys widespread support with over
100 nations participating."' GATT functions as the "main forum" for
two things, the reduction of trade barriers and the settlement of interna-
tional trade disputes.i" However, the major thrust of GATT is to reduce
domestic trade barriers to foreign imports, thus increasing international
trade. "'
In particular, the provisions of GATT include two basic concepts. The
most significant is that of the Most-Favored-Nation treatment (MFN)
which requires that GATI' members accord all other GATT members
equal treatment."'" Of secondary significance is the "national treatment"
doctrine which requires equal taxation and regulation of foreign and do
mestic products." Both provisions are intended to remove discrimina-
tory practices in international trade.
ii. GATT, the United States, and Mexico
Both the United States and Mexico are members of GATT. The United
States remains a significant participant in GATT and is engaged in "virtu-
ally all areas of GATT activity."" Mexico joined GATT in 1986 as part
of its market reform efforts. 7 In becoming a signator to GATT, Mexico
accepted a "permanent obligation" to reduce tariffs.'
100. Kenneth W. Abbot, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), I.E.L
I-A (1989).
101. Lise Sue Klaiman, Applying GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures to A Tayide
In Services Agreement: Proceed With Caution, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 657, 658
(1990).
102. Dunkle, Foreword, supra note 82. at v.
103. Id.
104. "[Any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party
to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded in
mediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties." GATT. supra note 83, at Article 1 (1). "Ar-
ticle I remains the cornerstone of GATT." WINHAI, supra note 34. at 47.
105. GATT, supra note 83, at Article III.
106. McGOVERN, supra note 75, at 84.
107. White House Fact Sheet, Aug. 24. 1992. Even before joining GAIT, however,
Mexico was accorded Most Favored Nation treatment by the United States. Under-
standing Concerning Trade and Investment Relations, Nov. 6. 1987, United States-Mex-
ico, 27 I.L.M. 438 (1988). For discussion of Most Favored Nation treatment, see supra
note 104 and accompanying text. See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text for
discussion of Mexico's market reforms.
108. Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negoti-
GATT still remains a vital part of international trade representing a
"consensus" of over 100 signatory nations.""' Furthermore, GATT will
remain the "likely basis of trade for the next decade.""' Though other
trade agreements, such as NAF'TA, will provide other market trading
regimes, the importance of GATT can not be understated and it is in the
best interest of the United States to attempt to accomplish "as much as
possible within its framework.""' GATT's legacy will remain as the fore-
runner in reducing protectionism, and thus increasing world trade." '
3. United States Response to Increasing International Trade
With increasing opportunities in international trade, the United States
made a concerted effort to become involved. As part of this effort, the
Trade Act of 1974 was passed."' The plan contained a number of ambi-
tious goals. First, it proposed to "foster economic growth and full em-
ployment in the United States,""' in part by reducing or eliminating bar-
riers to trade."' The plan expressly addressed the need for "fairness
and equity" in international trading, and acknowledged that the GATT
system needed reform."' In addition, and of particular relevance to
Mexico, the Trade Act of 1974 envisioned providing easier access to the
United States market to products from lesser developed countries."7
These goals were deemed necessary because it was believed that barri-
ers to international trade were resulting in lower economic growth in
foreign countries, and thus lower sales of U.S. products into those mar-
kets."'8 As a result, the President was "urged" to utilize all "appropriate
and feasible steps within his power" to attempt to reduce such barri-
ers."' In general, the Trade Act of 1974 was a codification of a recogni-
ation of a North American Free Trade Agreement, Free Trade Negotiation with Mexi-
co, Economic Impact, May 1, 1991, 1991 WL 434197 (N.A.F.T.A.) [hereinafter Re-
sponse of the Administration: Economic Impact].
109. S. REP. No. 266, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 260 (1992).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. WINIAM, supra note 34, at 44.
113. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
114. Id. § 2102(1).
115. Id. § 2102(2).
116. Id. 2102(3). A major problem of GATT lied in its dispute resolution provisions
or, rather, the lack thereof. Though often referring to dispute resolution, GATT con-
tains "no single, sharply defined dispute-settlement procedure." Klaiman, supY1, note
101, at 660-61, 661 n.20. In fact, in more recent years, the provisions providing for
dispute settlement have only been successfully invoked on "minor issues" with the
"tougher and more contentious issues" left unresolved. Id. at 664.
117. 19 U.S.C. § 2102(6) (1988).
118. Id. § 2112.
119. Id.
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tion that the growth of international trade was vital to the well-being of
the United States, and that this required market access and the
elimination of trade barriers. '2 ' The Trade Act of 1974 advanced the no-
tion of increasing trade by establishing regional trading.'
2 1
Shortly thereafter, another enactment was passed, the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979.122 Besides restating the goals of the 1974 Trade Act
of expanding world trade and increasing U.S. opportunities in such trade,
it was noted that "rules" were now becoming necessary. '2:' Part of
America's new goal was to "improve the rules of international trade and
to provide for the enforcement of such rules.' 2' While not addressing
whether there are any "rules" in international trade apart from those
existing under treaties,' 2 the United States recognized that the benefits
of international trade were contingent upon stability in international
trade.
In 1988, Congress revisited the issue of international trade with the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.'2' Again, the general
overall U.S. trading objectives of market access and reduction of barriers
were reiterated, and the Act echoed the call for a "more effective system
of international trading disciplines and procedures.' 27 However, the
United States also introduced an improved system of dispute settlement
as a principal trading objective. 2 1
In this abbreviated look at recent Congressional enactments relating to
international trade, the increasing sophistication and knowledge of the
U.S. government becomes apparent. The initial goal was merely to in-
crease international trade by removing barriers. Then, it was noted that
120. Id. § 2113.
121. Section 2486 of the Trade Act of 1974 provided in part: "The President shall
study the desirability of entering into trade agreements with countries in the northern
portion of the western hemisphere to promote the economic growth of the United St-
ates and such countries and the mutual expansion of market opportunities." Id. § 24
86(b). See infra notes 129-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of regional
trading areas.
122. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-82 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
123. Id. § 2502.
124. Id. § 2502(4).
125. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 69, at 1-22.
126. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
127. Id. § 2901(a).
128. "The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to dis-
pute settlement are . . . to provide for more effective and expeditious dispute set-
tlement mechanisms and procedures." Id. § 2901(b)(1).
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"rules" needed to be established and that simply increasing international
trade was not the final answer. This was further refined to the belief that
the "rules" required the inclusion of effective dispute settlement proce-
dures.
4. Movement Towards Free Trade Zones
Apart from GATT, there exists a move toward free trade zones. This is
not a novel movement but originated in the 1960s.'12 ' The purpose of a
free trade zone"' is to eliminate tariffs and trade barriers among the
member countries, and thus increase trade among the respective coun-
tries." Utilizing regional trading blocs as a new approach to trade,"
more than a half dozen such blocks have developed.""' The trade agree-
ments which exist in these blocks are all consistent with GATT." Such
129. WINHAM, supra note 34, at 118. In the 1960s, the developing countries negotiat-
ed a series of free trade agreements that subsequently failed. Id.; see infra note 219
and accompanying text.
130. GATT states: "A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two
or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce ...are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories in products originating in such territories." GATT, supro note 83, at Article
XXIV, 8(b).
131. Linda C. Rief, Conciliation As a Mechanism For the Resolution of Internation-
at Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDIIHA INT'L L.J. 579, 595 (1990).
132. Longworth, supra note 37. The approach outlined by GATT is deemed "outdat-
ed." Id. Present problems are better handled under regional agreements. Id.
133. Stewart, supra note 43. Such zones range from the European Community to a
zone encompassing only Australia and New Zealand. Id. The European Community
provides the most well known example and warrants further discussion.
The European Community (EC) was established as a "customs union," to elimi-
nate internal customs duties and establish external custom duties. U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, PUB. No. 2501, ThE EFFECTS OF GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITIN TilE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH FOLLOWUP REPORT (April 1992)
available in WESTLAW, FINT-ITC Database [hereinafter GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRA-
TION]. The European Community is actually an amalgamation of "three separate Eu-
ropean Communities, each governed by its own Treaty" but administered under a
single institutional structure. Mark L. Jones. Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, I.E.L. V-A-1.(A) (1989). The European Community embodies the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty), the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM Treaty), and the European Economic Community (EEC Trea-
ty). Id. The EEC Treaty is "the most important and far-reaching." Id. Article 2 of the
EEC Treaty states that the purpose is to create a common market, a market based
on free trade. Id. This stated purposes is similar to that of NAFTA. However, an im
portant feature of the EEC treaty is also a "transfer of sovereign powers" from the
participating countries to the Community. Id. This differs from that envisioned under
NAFrA. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. In fact, the EC has a broader
reach than NAF'A as it also proposes "political, social, and deeper economic and
institutional ties." GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. supra. The EC commits the mem-
ber nations to political union. Id.
134. CRISPO, supra note 35, at 174. Contra WINIIAM, supra note 34, at 119 (such
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free trade zones will likely be around for a "long stay," and will eventu-
ally form around the United States, Japan, and Europe." NAFTA allows
the United States to remain competitive with respect to other trading
blocks evolving in Europe and Japan. "' Regional trading blocks are at-
tractive because fewer difficulties arise in implementing free trade within
a small, less diverse group of countries. ' Increased trade and trading
agreements among "geographically close countries with cultural similari-
ties" is natural and expected as "the most easily reached."" This kind
of arrangement operates as a "catalyst" for increased trade and develop-
ment among the member countries.'
a. NAFTA as a free trade zone
NAFTA creates a free trade zone"" that allows for stronger competi-
tive posture between the members of NAFTA and other newly estab-
lished regions.' NAFTA is fully consistent with the GATT requirements
for a free trade area'42 GATT recognizes the advantages that can be
arrangements are "prima facie" violative of GATT).
135. Stewart, supra note 43, at 70. However, free trade areas are not always benefi-
cial. For example, the European Community envisioned that a "single internal market"
would prove economically beneficial to the member nations. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
Pub. No. 2268, 'TIE EFFECTS OF GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN TIlE EUROPE-
AN COMMUNITY ON THE UNITED STATES: FIRST FOLLOW-UP REPORT (Mar. 1990), available
in WESTLAW, FINT-ITC Database. However, the initial move toward integration was
hampered by "stagnating growth, high unemployment, and increased import competi-
tion" to the member countries resulting in protectionism, rather than integration. Id.
136. Baeza, supra note 15, at 259. Some argue that the GATT framework proceeds
too slowly and agreements like NAFTA are necessary to promote trade. WINIHAM,
supra note 34, at 119.
137. S. REP. No. 266, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1992).
138. Id.
139. Fitch, supra note 35. at 356-57. Such an agreement makes the member coun-
tries more efficient by "stimulating competition and driving inefficient businesses from
the market place." Id.
140. "The new NAFrA is clearly a regional FTA, and extending it to South America
would undoubtedly stamp it as regionalism par excellence." Jagdish Bhagwati. Beyond
NAFTA: Clinton's Trading Choices, FOREIGN POL'Y 155 (Summer 1993). For a discus-
sion of possible extension of NAFTA to South America, see ittfra notes 203-19 and
accompanying text.
141. Sergio Munoz & Juanita Darling, Jaime Serra Piiche: 7Te Free Trade
Agreement From the Mexican Perspective, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993, at M3. Jaime
Serra Puche, the head of the Mexican negotiation team to NAFTA, stated: "[TIhere
will be job creation in the three countries due to the synergy of the three countries'
economies. This would make the region more competitive vis-a-vis other regions." Id.
142. White House Fact Sheet, Aug. 24, 1992. GATT contains a limited exception for
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garnered by trade with neighboring countries.' NAFTA was negotiated
to be "GATT-consistent."'4 It not only complies with GATT, but pro-
vides knowledge that can be used for future improvements to the trea-
ty.' 5 Some argue that the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,
the model for NAFTA,"6 does not supplant GATT, but actually "ex-





President Clinton, in campaigning for NAFTA, regarded the passage of
NAFTA as "essential" to the United States effort to remain competitive
with Europe and Asia.'"' However, others believe that the creation of a
regional trading bloc is unwise."' These opponents argue that such re-
gionalism leads other countries to adopt "defensive" tactics such as the
creation of further regional blocks that diminish world trade." ' GATT,
this kind of arrangement under Article 24 that "allows a group of countries to dis-
mantle all trade barriers only among themselves." Bhagwati, supra note 140, at 155.
This is one of the "most important" exceptions to the GATT provisions. Abbot, supra
note 100. NAFTA states under Article 101 that: "The Parties to this Agreement, con-
sistent with Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, hereby
establish a free trade area." NAFTA, supra note 11, ch. 1, art 101. Furthermore, the
participating Parties acknowledge the existence of GATT under Article 103: "The Par-
ties affirm their existing rights and obligations with respect to each other under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade . . . ." Id. at art. 103.
143. Article XXIV of GATT provides in part that: "The provisions of this Agreement
shall not be construed to prevent . . . [aldvantages accorded by any contracting party
to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic." GATT, supro note 83. at
Article 24, 3(a).
144. TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES, supra note 53.
145. S. REP. No. 266, 102d Cong., 2(d Sess. 264 (1992).
146. See infr'a notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
147. CRispo, supra note 35, at 171.
148. Clinton Signs NAFTA Side Agreements, Kicks Off Campaign to Pass Legisla-
tion, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 16, 1993. Clinton noted how international competi-
tion to the United States has already gone about "consolidating and creating huge
trading blocks." Id.
149. Bhagwati, supra note 140, at 155.
150. Id. They foresee dire consequences of attempting to push the NAFTA agree-
ment southward.
[Ilt will certainly invite a defensive, if not retaliatory, bloc in Asia. Divisions
will be sharpened and the world economy fragmented into four blocs: an
expanded EC, a NAFTA extended to the Americas, a Japan-centered Asian
bloc, and a marginalized group of developing countries, many with low in-
comes and only just turning to export-oriented strategies. We should not
favor that scenario.
Id.
This view can be substantiated by the reaction of the world's other industrial
powers to the European Community's effort for further integration. "[TIhird countries,
including the United States" foresee a potential creation of "Fortress Europe" that will
protect against foreign imports. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2268. TilE EFFECTS
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however, allows free trade areas for their desirable consequences of
increasing trade among the member countries, and indicates that their
purpose should not be for the creation of a defensive position."1 ' Yet,
others argue further that while NAFTA might fit the technical require-
ments of a GATT free trade area, it reflects a "diminished U.S. commit-
ment" to GATT and the multilateral trading system."2
b. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA),In
precursor to NAFTA
The United States and Canada have had a free trade agreement since
1989.'' This agreement, the FTA, complies with the requirements of
GATT."" Generally, the FTA is thought to have benefitted both coun-
tries."6 Some NAFVA proponents state that NAFTA broadens the FTA
by including Mexico, 117 while others indicate that it merely "builds" on
OF GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THE UNITED
STATES: FIRST FOLLOW-UP REPORT (Mar. 1990), available in WESTLAW, FINT-ITC Data-
base.
151. Article XXIV of GATT provides in part:
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing free trade
through the voluntary development of closer integration between the econo-
mies of the parties to such agreements [free trade area agreements]. They
also recognize that the purpose of a . . . free-trade area, should be to facili-
tate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the
trade of other contracting parties with such territories.
GATT, supra note 83, at Article XXIV, 4 (emphasis added).
152. Odiaga, supra note 24, at 141.
153. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1985, 27 I.L.M. 281 [herein-
after FTA]. For a discussion of the impact of the FTA, see generally CRISPo, supra
note 35.
154. John Urguhart, Canada Businesses Urge Govcnment, Mexico to Adopt NAFTA
if U.S. Drops Out, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1993, at A14.
155. WlNIIAM, supra note 34, at 47 n.7. This FTA did not involve the introduction of
protectionist measures between the United States and Canada relative to the rest of
the world. Id. at 47. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
156. "Traders and investors on both sides of the border" took advantage of the
many opportunities" created by the agreement. Urguhart, supra note 154. But see
David C. Williams, Letters to the Editor - Higher Wages, Fewer Jobs, WASHl. POST,
Sept. 25, 1993, at A20 (indicating that Canada has suffered economically from the
deal and that "most Canadians regret the pact").
157. Urguhart, supra note 154, at A14. The Canadians were also favorable to trade
with Mexico, as Canadian business people favored a Canada-Mexican agreement
should NAF'TA have failed. Id.
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the FTA.' In any case, the FTA is appropriately known to be the "pre-
decessor" to NAFI'A.'" When the FTA was developed, it was thought to
be a singular event and not disruptive of the GATT framework."" How-
ever, with the passage of NAFTA, it is clear that the United States has
adopted regional trading zones as a means of improving trade
relations.''
III. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. NAFTA in General
NAFTA represents the "most creative step toward a new world order
taken by any group of countries since the end of the Cold War."
NAFTA is merely a "logical confirmation" of a process already started
and continuing independent of the treaty.' " The agreement takes advan-
tage of a "remarkable improvement" in the United States ability to com-
pete in the world market.'' Most significantly, NAFTA captures the
Mexican market and potentially the Latin American market for the Unit-
ed States.'5
158. Overview: NAFTA, supra note 18.
159. Horlick & Debusk, supra note 25, at 21. Most applicable to this Comment, the
dispute resolution provisions under the FrA have been well documented elsewhere.
See generally Ton J.M. ZuUdwijk, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Under the Ftree
Trade Agreement, 40 ME. L. REV. 325 (1988); David P. Cluchey, Dispute Resolution
Provisions of the Canada-United States Fiee Trade Agreement, 40 ME. L. REv. 335
(1988); Leon E. Trakman, Privatizing Dispute Resolution Under the Fee Trade
Agreement: Truth or Fancy?, 40 ME. L. REV. 349 (1988).
160. WINHAM, supra note 34, at 118.
161. Id. at 118-19.
162. Henry A. Kissinger, With NAFTA, U.S. Finally Creates a New World Order,
L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1993, at M2. This agreement does not embody a "conventional
trade agreement but the architecture of a new international system." Id.
163. Adela de la Torre, Getting A Piece of the Mexican Rock, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11,
1993, at B7. Most "astute" business people view the upcoming years as a great oppor-
tunity "for entering the relatively immature Mexican consumer market with fewer
competitors." Id.
164. Alfred L. Malabre, Jr., The Outlook: Economy's Slow Pace Masks Competitive-
ness, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1993, at Al. America's newly competitive stance can be
directly traced to the increasing competitive cost of U.S. labor. Id. This increased
competitiveness has caused U.S. exports to be the fastest-growing segment of the U.S.
economy. Id. This merely spurs on America's status as the "world's largest exporter."
Id.
165. BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sep. 16, 1993. The United States Trade Representative
stated forcefully:
Shame on us if we allow those markets to be taken by others. And surely, if
we pull away from those markets by rejecting this agreement, we know who
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NAFTA acts to unite "rich and poor nations in a free-trade zone.
'
""1W
The issues involved in dealing with developing countries were specifical-
ly addressed in GATT.6 7 The need for increased trade between devel-
oped and developing countries has also been addressed by the United
Nations.' ' Agreements such as NAFTA between the industrialized and
developing countries have proven beneficial to participating parties in the
past. ' Thus, in linking together the developed country of the United
States with the developing country of Mexico, NAFTA can have stabiliz-
ing effects for the region as a whole." '
will be there in a moment .... I believe I could take this document to the
European Community or to the new Japanese government and put it on their
desk and it would not take more than five minutes to get their signature on
this agreement.
Id.
166. David Hage, Free Trade: Fear, Frenzy and Facts, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP. 65,
Sept. 13, 1993. Mr. Hage states that NAFVA, in joining the richer nation of the United
States with the poorer nation of Mexico, will likely result in the same outcome as
when "the wealthy countries of Europe" accepted the less economically powerful
nations of Spain and Portugal into their common market. Id. The richer nations bene-
fitted from the deal as liberalized trade increased the wealth of the poorer nations
which in turn made "them into bigger export markets for their richer neighbors." Id.
This scenario could play out extremely well for the United States as Mexico has nu
merous potential consumers, but without the spendable income. Response of the Ad
ministration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a North American
Free Trade Agreement, Free Trade Negotiations with Mexico. Environmental Matters,
May 1. 1991, 1991 WL 434200 (N.A.F.T.A.) [hereinafter Response of the Administra-
tion: Environmental Matters]. "Mexico has over one-third of the U.S. population, but
its economy is only 1/25th the size of ours." Id.
167. Abbott, supra note 100. These are presented in Article XVIII and Articles
XXXVI through XXXVIII. Id.
168. In 1964, the United Nations General Assembly established the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development. McGOVERN, supra note 75, at 50. One of the
principal functions is "[tlo promote international trade, especially with a view to ac-
celerating economic development, particularly trade between countries at different
stages of development . . . ." Id.
169. Espana, supra note 17, at 42 n.14. The successful partnerships between the
European Community and Spain, Portugal, and Greece, as well as the partnership
between the United States and Israel attest to this fact. Id.
170. STANLEY D. METZGER, LAW AND POLICY MAKING FOR TRADE AMONG "HAVE" AND
"HAVE-NOT" NATIONS 1 (John Carey ed. 1968). In 1967, United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral U. Thant indicated that the most challenging struggle facing the world was less-
ening the gap between rich and poor nations. Id. The Secretary-General felt that the
gap existing between the rich and poor nations, between the nations of the North
versus the South, was of more concern for the security of the world than the ideo-
logical and political gap between the East and West. Id. "[In the long run what is
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B. Mexico... as a Trading Partner
This Comment focuses on trade between the United States and Mexi-
co. Trade between the United States and Canada has already been exam-
ined in detail.'72 The trade relationship between the United States and
Mexico is extremely significant because of the substantial opportunities
available to both countries.'7 1 As a global power, the United States has
interests throughout the world,'74 yet the effect of the Mexico-United
States relationship has importance to each other "without parallel else-
where in the world."'75 Though in the past the relationship had focused
on "managing irritants," it is now viewed as one that harbors a unique
opportunity for growth.' The importance that Mexico will have to
America will be preeminent in the next century.' 71 Mexico provides a
much more explosive is the widening gulf between the North and the South." Id.
171. Though not approaching the economic might of the United States, Mexico is
favorably viewed in Latin America and designated the "Colossus of the North."
METZGER, supra note 170, at 37. The strengths of Mexico have been succinctly sum-
marized as: "economic growth, financial strength, political stability, world stature,
natural resources, trained people, [and] government support." DOING BUSINESS IN MEXI-
CO, supra note 15, at 2-5.
172. See generally Ann Carlsen, The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: A
Bilateral Approach to the Reduction of Trade Barriers, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J.
299 (1989); Amerlia Porges et al., The U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, 82 AA.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 395 (1988).
173. U.S. Mexico Binational Commission Meets in Mexico City, DEP'T ST. BULL.
76(6), Oct. 1989, at 76(6). Secretary of State James Baker, announcing a belief held
by himself and President Bush, stated that U.S.-Mexico relations had become the
most important link in American trade due to the common border and had grown
into a unique relationship of exceptional "breadth, complexity, and vibrancy." Id.
Stated another way, "the United States and Mexico have been dating for years."
Susan Dentzer, The Pain and Gain of Trade, 113 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP. 62,
Sept. 28, 1993.
174. In fact, for a greater portion of the twentieth century, United States interests
focused on distant countries, rather than neighboring countries. Fitch, supra note 35,
at 358-59.
175. Alejandro Orgarrio & Leonel Pereznieto Castro, Mexico-United States Relations:
Economic Integration and Foreign Investment, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 223 (1990) (quot-
ing Rogers, Approaching Mexico, 72 FOR. POL. 196 (1988)). "Mexico and the U.S.
need each other." DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, supra note 15, at 5.
176. DEPT. ST. BULL, supra note 173. This "managing irritants" may in fact be a
kind description as the relationship between the United States and Mexico has been
"tainted by conflicting interest, differing conceplual points of view, misunderstandings,
clashing passions, and even violence." Ogarrio & Castro, supra note 175, at 226.
177. Kissinger, supra note 162. "De facto" open borders between our countries, and
the nearly twenty million Mexican residents in America inextricably link our coun-
tries. Id. This huge border provides a valuable opportunity for increased trade be-
tween the United States and Mexico. Politicians in the states bordering Mexico were
the "biggest backers" of NAFTA when noting the potential for increased trade. Labor
Letter, Southern Union Locals Join the anti-NAFTA Campaign, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28,
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"stellar market" for trade with the United States.'78
1. NAFTA From Mexico's Perspective
Understanding the need for international trade to compete in the glob-
al market," President Salinas of Mexico first moved for the trade pact
in 1990." Salinas stated that this opportunity is one that happens "once
in a generation."... Mexico avidly supports NAFTA as a means to solidi-
1993, at Al. See also Joel Simon, NAFTA - 7the View from Tijuana: Free Trade in
Mexico, NATION, Nov. 30, 1992, at 664 (noting how the growth of Tijuana has directly
"benefitted its U.S. neighbor, San Diego"). A good portion of wealth earned in Tijuana
is later spent in San Diego. Id. However, this isn't surprising as Mexico buys Ameri-
can goods; 70 cents of every dollar that Mexico spends on imports is for American
goods. Overview: NAFTA, supra note 18. But see Fitch, supra note 35, at 375 (sug-
gesting that besides the common border, the United States and Mexico seemingly
have little else in common).
178. Rebecca Reynolds, Fact Sheet: Mexico - A Solid Market Continues To Serve
US. Companies, 4 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, May 17, 1993, at 353(3). In 1992,
Mexico surpassed Japan as the second-largest market for exported United States
goods, and presently continues to be the fastest-growing American export market. Id.
Furthermore, and particularly important to the United States government, the United
States ran a trade surplus with Mexico in manufactured goods that was larger than
any other trading partner. Id.
179. Salinas proposed NAFIA "after a 1990 trip to Europe convinced him that West-
ern European investors were turning to Eastern Europe and that his country needed
to attract U.S. businesses." Simon, supra note 177.
180. Asra Q. Nomani & Dianne Solis, NAFTA Is Facing Difficult Trial in the Con-
gress, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1993, at A3. The Mexican government pushed for NAFTA
as "the crowning achievement of sweeping economic reforms." Id. Salinas' interest led
to joint preparatory work in June 1990 of a Mexican-U.S. agreement under the en-
dorsement of President Bush and President Salinas. White House Fact Sheet, Aug. 24.
1992. Canada later joined the negotiation process in February 1991, when the negotia-
tions became known as NAFTA. Id. Formal negotiations commenced in June of 1991.
Id. On August 12, 1992, the United States, Canada, and Mexico completed formal
negotiations of NAFTA. Report of the Administration on NAFTA, supra note 19. See
generally Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement, Pre-
pared by the Governments of Canada, The United Mexican States, and the United
States of America. available in WESTLAW, NAFTA Database (providing a synopsis of
the agreement as the agreement then stood on August 12, 1992). The parties involved
at that time included the Canadian Minister of Industry, Science and Technology and
Minister for International Trade Michael Wilson, Mexican Secretary of Trade and In-
dustrial Development Jaime Serra and United States Trade Representative Carla Hills.
Id.
181. Paul B. Carroll & Dianne Solis, NAFTA Is an Opportunity the U.S. Shouldn't
Miss, Salinas Contends, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19. 1993, at A6. Salinas contends that
NAFTA will improve United States-Mexican relations, and will allow the United
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fy its own economic reforms.'12 "After centuries of trying to choke off
outside influences," Mexico now accepts foreign goods into its country
and believes in its own competitive stance."' This practice of trade lib-
eralization has turned the Mexican economy from a "basket case to a
success story. ' 84
President Salinas stated that Mexico's acceptance of NAFTA "heralds a
commitment to fair and competitive development. " " Due to the dra-
matic market reforms, exports to Mexico from the United States in-
creased twice as fast as that of U.S. exports to other parts of the
world. "' The United States has a tremendous amount to gain by trading
with Mexico and the changes in Mexico's political and economic struc-
ture foretell a strong commitment to increased international trade under
NAFTA.
2. Mexico's Political Climate
The political climate in Mexico changed dramatically with the election
of Carlos Salinas de Gortari as the sixty-fourth President of the United
States of Mexico." 7 Under Salinas, the Mexican government has been
strongly in favor of NAFTA, and has viewed it as the "centerpiece" of the
free market reforms initiated in the country." In addition, political re-
States to "redefine its relations with all of Latin America." Id. But see Linda Robin-
son, Reaching to the South: Free Trade Alone Cannot Bring Mexico and the United
States Together, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 1, 1993, at 43 (NAFTA unlikely to
impact the "explosive political issues" that divide the two countries).
182. Asra Q. Nomani & John Urqhart, Trade Accord's Side Talks Stall Over Sanc-
tions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1993, at A3.
183. Matt Moffett, Mexico Has a Lot Riding on Outcome of the Trade Debate, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 15, 1993, at A18. This signals a "fundamental change in the country's
relationship with the rest of the world." Id. See generally Espana, supra note 17, at
41 (outlining the market reforms undertaken by Mexico).
184. Alan Murray, The Outlook: Nqfta Win is Crucial To Asia Talks Success, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 15, 1993, at Al. This growth parallels that of those nations previously
liberalizing their trade. "Trade liberalization has been a major factor contributing to
the unprecedented growth of the U.S. and global economies during the last four de-
cades." Response of the Administration, Economic Impact, supra note 108.
185. BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 16, 1993. Salinas noted that the Mexican people
were ready to "compete with the other economies of this region." Id.
186. White House Fact Sheet on NAFTA, Bus. AMi., Aug. 24, 1992, at 22. Between
1986 and 1991, U.S. exports to Mexico rose from $12.4 billion to $33.3 billion. Id.
187. Ignacio Gomez-Palatio, The New Regulation on Foreign Investment in Mexico:
A Difficult Task, 12 Houts. J. INT'L L. 253, 253 (1990). In fact, this election may later
be seen as the "turning point in the history of modem Mexico." Id.
188. Paul B. Carroll & Dianne Solis, Fnom U.S., Mexican Executives Hear Sound of
an Opening Bell, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1993, at A12. The passage of NAFT'A not only
benefits Mexico directly in its dealings with the United States and Canada, but also
allows Mexico to further concentrate on agreements with other South American coun-
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forms have allowed for greater participation by opposition groups."
Salinas has taken numerous steps in the past months to improve the po-
litical framework in Mexico, including substantial campaign reform
efforts." Overall, the political structure in Mexico has undergone bene-
ficial changes and appears receptive to further reform. Yet, some still
argue such reforms are insufficient and that trade with Mexico is
inappropriate.9 ' Under either view, the political system must be taken
into account because it has "nurtured" the economic system in the
past. 192
3. Mexico's Economic Climate
Although the United States and Mexico shared strong trade bonds
based on physical proximity, they never shared similar economic poli-
cies.' In the early 1980s, Mexico underwent a dramatic change in eco-
nomic philosophy that allowed for NAFTA to be proposed and adopt-
ed.'"' This change was significant because it occurred due to internal
tries promoting free trade and investment. Id. This furthers the ultimate goal of
NAFYA and similar agreements, to advance a hemisphere of free trade.
189. 4 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH May 17, 1993, at 354.
190. From spending $2 billion to establish voter identification, capping campaign
spending to allow greater minority representation, and promoting exit polls to reduce
the chances of ballot tampering. Carroll & Solis. supra note 181. But see Fitch, snpra
note 35, at 379. "[11n Mexico, corruption is essential to the operation and survival of
the political system - the system has never lived without corruption and would disin-
tegrate or change beyond recognition if it tried to do so." Id.
191. Arthur Jones, Free Trade With an Unfree Land, 29 NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORT-
ER, April 16, 1993, at 10. See also Fitch, supra note 35, at 379.
192. Luis Rubio, Mexico in Perspective: An Essay on Mexico's Economic Reform
and the Political Consequences, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 235 (1990).
193. Barriers in Free Trade, supra note 24 at 141.
U.S. trade and economic policy was based on free-market and free-trade
principles, while in Mexico the state intervened in almost every aspect of
economic decision making . . . . The NAFTA became possible because of
what amounted to an economic revolution, considering where Mexico was
before. Without the substantial economic reforms that occurred in Mexico. it
is unlikely that the United States would have been willing to pursue NAFTA
negotiations.
Id.
194. 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Aug. 10, 1992, at 620(2). By rejecting its "traditional
economic policies," Mexico's adoption of a free market economy fueled the growth of
United States-Mexican economic ties. Id. This economic liberalization, which NAFTA
will "enshrine and expand", directly increases Mexico's economic growth, which in
turn benefits the United States by providing opportunities for exports and investment.
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measures taken by the Mexican government, and as such, laid the basis
for lasting change."' The increased trade between Mexico and the Unit-
ed States would simply not have occurred if Mexico had not made eco-
nomic reforms."' This change in Mexico can not be overstated as Mexi-
co has become "one of the most open, market-oriented developing coun-
tries in the world."" ' This reflects a true reversal of identity. " The re-
percussions of this fundamental reversal has had profound effects
throughout Mexico's economy. '
Yet, it must also be understood that the 1980s were a period of "eco-
nomic crisis" for Mexico.""1 This economic reform is welcome but
should be approached with caution,2°' because up until the early 1980s,
the Mexican model of a closed economy and closed political system
resulted in surprising growth and stability making Mexico the "envy of
other developing nations."'" It is thus important to note that the "new
and improved" Mexico has only been such for a relatively short period of
time.
C. Mexico as Gateway to Increased Trade in Latin America
Many view NAFTA as a signal indicating a future joining of all the
countries of the Americas as "partners seeking mutual prosperity.I'M
Id. For a general outline of the objectives of the Mexican market reform, see
Fernando Sanchez Ugarte, Mexico's New Foreign Investment Climate, 12 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 243, 248 (1990).
195. METZGER, supra note 170, at 8. Such fundamental change, if it is to last, must
come from within. "[Eixternal assistance . . . ranging in importance from marginal to
substantial assistance, plays a subordinate role to internal self-help measures." Id.
196. Espana, supra note 17.
197. 4 U.S. DEP'T STATE DISPATCHi, May 17. 1993, at 354(3). The reforms include
"reducing barriers to trade and foreign investment, privatizing most state enterprises,
and improving legal protection for firms doing business in Mexico." Id. This was after
being deemed one of the "world's most protected" markets. Response of the Adminis-
tration: Economic Impact, supra note 108.
198. "Mexicans, who a generation ago were ardent protectionists, embrace the re-
forms." After NAFTA, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1993, at 71.
199. Matt Moffett, Ahead of Itself Mexico's Stock Market Hlas Grown Fivefold Since
1990; Everything Else Still Has to Catch Up. WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1993, at R8. This
article notes how the Mexican stock market, the Bolsa de Valores, was a "penny-ante
thing" until relatively recently. i. However. owing in part to the economic reform,
the Mexican stock market has seen a "torrent of foreign investment" that has in-
creased the Bolsa fivefold since 1990. Id. The Bolsa has become "the world's largest
emerging market." Id.
200. TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES, supra note 144.
201. Id.
202. Stephen T. Zamora, Foreword: Searching for the Mexican Model of Govern-
ment, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 181, 182-83 (1990).
203. William R. Rhodes, The Latin Tigers Are Ready to Roar, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31,
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NAFTA was merely to be a first step in a plan proposed by President
Bush,""" known as the Enterprise for the America's Initiative."" Adop-
tion of NAFrA advanced President Bush's "vision of economic growth
through free trade" making America more globally competitive. Presi-
dent Clinton also views NAFTA merely as a "first step" indicating that
trade advances will also be made to other Latin American states.
20 7
From the other side, Latin America believes the agreement to also be the
1993, at A7. A unity of the Americas is possible due to dramatic market changes that
have occurred in Latin America, the same type of changes that led to explosive
growth in Asia. Id. Free market reforms are not limited to Mexico but are also evi-
dent in Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia. Venezuela, Uruguay, and Peru. Id. Passage
of NAFTA will solidify and encourage these market reforms by developing ties among
the Latin countries, thus opening "the way for an era of prosperity in the hemi-
sphere." Id.
204. President Bush had a program called the "Enterprise for America's Initiative"
(EAI) that was to create an "economic partnership" with Latin America. James
Gerstenzang & Art Pine, Bush Proposes Free Trade With Latin America in New
Partnership, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1990, at page A9. His goal was to create a "hemi-
sphere-wide free-trade zone" benefitting the economies of the region. Id. Bush argued
that free trade should replace loans to such countries and would stimulate the econ-
omies of the region. Id. Bush had stated that "trade, not aid, will draw our two na-
tions [the United States and Mexico] closer together as neighbors with mutual respect
for one another." Response of the Administration: Environmental Matters, supra note
166. However, others argued that such a plan was "impractical as policy." New Trade
Plan-Or Trade-Of]?, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1990, at B6. They believed the region too
diverse to simply cite increased trade as the remedy and noted that this had been
tried in the past without success. Id. However viewed, it is clear NAFTA was to be
a starting point and that most of the "key provisions" of NAFTA were concluded
during President Bush's administration. Kissinger, supra note 162. Further, rejection of
NAFTA would "almost certainly mark the end of the EAI." Espana, supra note 17.
205. This initiative was to "pave the way to free trade throughout the Western
Hemisphere." U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2403, OPERATION OF TIHE TRADE
AGREEMENTS PROGRAMi 42ND REPORT 1990, (July 1991), available in WESTLAW, FINT-
ITC Database. The United States entered into preliminary agreements with Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. i. These agreements were initi-
ated to utilize "the region's wealth of natural, human, and physical assets." Id. Addi-
tionally, with a population of over 400 million, a vast untouched consumer market
was available. Id.
206. Overview: NAFIA, supra note 18.
207. Bob Davis & Jackie Calmes, llouse Approves NAFTA, Pr-oviding President With
Cracial Victory, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1993, at Al. While noting that NAFTA is mere-
ly the first step towards increased trade, President Clinton also understands the great
potential involved as Latin America represents an extremely imponant market for
American goods. See BNA INT'L DAILY, supra note 39.
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initial step in integrating "all countries of the Western hemisphere.""'
Others have proposed that NAFrA can provide a model to establish a
trading zone with the Pacific Rim.""
This area has shown and can again show significant growth for the
United States.2" President Clinton believes that the political and eco-
nomic reforms of the area make it a prime location for further trade.4
Other government leaders have echoed this belief."' Mexico can lead
the way by providing the "economic model" for the region.2 ' 3 In fact,
many Latin American countries have already chosen "free-market, out-
ward-looking economic reforms along Mexican lines."' "Almost over-
night," a highly protected region of the world became one of the "most
open to trade.12 5 As with Mexico, the area has undergone an "economic
rebirth.
'2 1
The United States must become involved in trade with the region if it
is to flourish. A regional trading area is generally not successful unless
208. Espana, supra note 17.
209. Congressman David Dreier indicated NAFTA should provide a start for "ex-
panding a free trade regime to include other countries in Latin America and the Pa-
cific Rim." H.R. REP. No. 128(11), 103d Cong., 1st Sess 10 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 309, 309.
210. Latin America experienced a 6% economic growth rate throughout the 1960s
and 1970s. The Resurgence of Democracy in Latin America, Jan. 1985. at 65. This
represented "steady, strong, and substantial" growth. Id. The Latin American market is
the United States' fastest-growing export market. Stewart, supra note 43. This can all
be traced to the "impressive strides" that Latin American countries have made in
reforming their economies. Naim, supra note 39.
211. 4 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCl, May 17, 1993, at 354. The rate of growth of exports
to the area is three times faster than that to the rest of the world. Id.
212. For the Record. WASHI. POST, Sept. 26, 1993, at C6. Commerce Secretary Ron
Brown proposes that the United States must make a "particular effort to explore and
open new and emerging markets." Id. After noting the importance of NAV"TA, Brown
indicates it should be America's new goal to create a "hemispheric free trade zone."
Id.
213. U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATcti, supra note 211.
214. Keatley, supra note 60. In fact, many nations in Latin America consider eventu-
al membership in a region wide free trade pact as "vital" to their economic future.
Id.
215. Naim, supra note 39. In fact, "almost all" of the Latin America countries have
adopted market reforms with the same general direction of "more markets, less
state." Id. However, this article indicates that such changes were dramatic for the
region, and the area needs time to adjust to a newly created market format. Id. Oth-
er countries cannot expect the area to be a huge trading success from the outset. Id.
216. Tom Petruno, Hot, Healthier Latin Markets Attracting Cash, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
9, 1994, at D3. The area's potential has resulted in a large inflow of investor money.
Id. "Passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement ...helped refocus inves-
tors not just on Mexico, but on all Latin economies." Id.; see supt note 199 and ac-
companying text for the impact NAFITA had on the Mexican stock market.
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obtaining "trade diversion from outside sources."21 7 For successful and
sustainable growth in lesser developed countries, a developed country,
such as the United States, must be involved in the trade expansion."' In
the past, efforts to trade merely among Latin American countries were
only moderately successful because a developed country was not in-
volved. 19
IV. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
A. General Introduction
NAFTA relies primarily on international arbitration as a means of dis-
pute resolution for international commercial disputes." ° This system of
international commercial arbitration developed as a way of efficiently re
solving international trade disputes without having to proceed under
national court systems with the attendant delays and uncertainties.2 1 In-
ternational commercial arbitration removed the uncertainty surrounding
international trade' It was believed that national courts of trading
countries could not be "relied on to resolve commercial conflicts fairly
and promptly."" An international body dealing with international com-
217. METZGER, supra note 170, at 35.
218. Id. at 36.
219. For example, in 1960, the Latin America Free Trade Area was established by
the Treaty of Montevideo that initially linked nine, and later eleven Latin American
countries. Id. at 35-36. After initial gains, growth leveled off and it became clear that
trade occurring only among lesser developed countries did not cause significant
growth, which would have resulted in trade with a developed partner. Id. at 35-36.
220. See infra note 321 and accompanying text.
221. Charles G. Fenwick, Inter-American Commercial Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ARBITRATION 181 (Martin Domke ed. 1958).
222. Vitek Danilowicz, The Choice of Applicable Law inl International Arbitration, 9
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 235, 236 (1986). This article notes that although arbi-
tration is "no longer necessarily less expensive . . . nor . . . faster" than court litiga-
tion, it still allows the parties to "avoid the uncertainties and complexities of foreign
litigation." Id.
223. Naim, supra note 39. The reasons for avoiding foreign courts included:
Unpredictability of the enforcement of any judgement rendered; fear of not
being treated impartially in the other party's country; concern that their dis-
putes will be aired in public; concern Ihat the lack of technical expertise in
a jury will lead to an improper result; and, the realization that court proceed-
ings are almost always expensive and extremely time consuming.
Hope H. Camp, Jr., Binding Arbitration: A Preferred Alternative For Resolving Com-
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mercial disputes does not exist, thus businesspeople can only resort to
national courts or international arbitration."2 '
However, even with the benefits of international commercial arbitra-
tion, disputes still were subject, in part, to differing national court sys-
tems. A greater degree of certainty in international arbitration was ob-
tained by the adoption of international conventions related to arbitra-
tion." The recognized need for establishing a framework related to in-
ternational commercial arbitration through international conventions
paralleled the growth of "global markets and the growing economic inter-
dependence of nations" that resulted after the end of the Second World
War."
In sum, arbitration has become "the agreed means of dispute settle-
ment" with regard to international transactions." The use of arbitration
provides an "effective way to secure impartial resolution" of disputes
occurring between trading parties.' Various sources exist examining
how international commercial arbitration operates.' Additionally, a
host of arbitral institutions can be consulted as further resources."'
nercial Disputes Between Mexican and U.S. Businessmen, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 718, 724
(1991).
224. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, TIlE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 19 (1986). Between national courts and inlernational arbi-
tration, "the balance comes down firmly in favor of arbitration." Id.
225. RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 383 (1985). See infra notes
269-302 and accompanying text for a discussion of such conventions. The means by
which foreign judgements were rendered in differing countries was unsatisfactory to
business people, who strongly advocated the adoption of international conventions. Id.
at 385. International conventions have, to a large extent, resolved the problem of the
execution of foreign arbitral awards. Id. at 394.
226. VRATISLAV PECIIOTA, WORLD ARBITRATION REPORTER 23.0 (1987). See supra notes
83-98 and accompanying text for discussion of the growth of global markets occur-
ring after World War II.
227. RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487 Reporter's Notes 1
(1987).
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., ISAAK I. DORE, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION UNDER TIlE UNCITRAL
RULES: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS (1986). This source attempts to present the "overarching
scheme" the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law has adopted to
provide for the "peaceful settlement of international trade disputes." Id.
230. For example. "the International Chamber of Commerce, the American Arbitra-
tion Association, the London Court of Arbitration, the Japan Commercial Arbitration
Association, the Arbitration Association of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission" are all well-known. RESTATEMENT
(TIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 487 reporter's note 4. See generally IIANDBOOK OF
INSTITUTIONAL A.RBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (E. Cohn et al. eds. 1977).
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B. International Commercial Arbitration and the United States
Arbitration has recently won increasing favor. The former president of
the American Bar Association signaled approval for the arbitration pro-
cess 31 and former Chief Justice Burger has been outspoken in its sup-
port." Additionally, the United States has wholeheartedly accepted ar-
bitration in the field of international commercial dealings.
The United States is signatory to both of the international arbitration
conventions specifically provided for in NAFTA.2'  Foreign arbitral
awards are "freely enforced" in the United States' and the nation has
adopted international commercial arbitration to such an extent that it is
deemed one of the biggest supporters of this method of trade dispute
settlement u  The United States follows an international norm of ac-
tively enforcing arbitration agreements and awards used in international
commercial disputes."
The use of arbitration in international business benefits parties en-
gaged in an international business deal by providing a means whereby
231. ABA Officer: ADR Has Come Into Its Own, ARB. J., Mar. 1991, at 3. Talbot
D'Alemberte, then president-elect of the ABA, expressed his approval of the arbitra-
tion process in a speech given to the American Arbitration Association. Id.
232. Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, ARB. J., Dec. 1985, at 3, 6. Chief Justice
Burger, in an, address to the American Arbitration Association and the Minnesota
State Bar Association in 1985, commented: "My own experience persuades me that in
terms of cost, time, and human wear and tear, arbitration is vastly better than con-
ventional litigation for many kinds of cases." Id.
233. See infra notes 269-302 and accompanying text.
234. Even in instances where an arbitration award has not been specifically provid-
ed for by statute, the United States recognizes the award to the same extent as for-
eign judgments. RESTATEMENT (TIlIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 487 reporter's note 8.
Foreign arbitral awards are generally "only refused on grounds that would justify
refusal to recognize or enforce foreign judgments." Id.
235. S. REP. No. 266. 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1992).
236. International Commercial Arbitration and International Public Policy, 81 AI.
Soc'¥ INT'L L. PROC. 372, 375-76 (1987). This is partly symbolized by the fact that
United States courts refer to arbitral awards made outside the United States as "in-
ternational" arbitration awards rather than "foreign" awards. Id. 376. An additional
factor contributing to U.S. Support of international arbilration is that the UNICTRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration "parallels existing United States
law." TIlE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION KIT 101 (Laura Ferris Brown ed., 3d ed. 1986).
If so, the United States has clearly adopted an international approach as the Model
Law was intended to establish a uniform international practice and procedure, thus
removing arbitration from the "parochial law of any adopting state." Id.; see also
HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV PECIIOTA, WORLD ARBITRATION REPORTER 2814 (1993) (noting
U.S. "federal arbitration law to be strongly supportive of international arbitration").
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they "can choose the forum, the rules of procedure, and the applicable
law" for any dispute that could arise."7 All that is required is a well-
drafted arbitration agreement or clause in the contract between the par-
ties. However, the advantages and benefits of arbitration are illusory un-
less these well-tailored, specific agreements are then enforced. "For arbi-
tration agreements to be effective ... national courts must be able to
enforce agreements to arbitrate and the ensuing arbitral awards."" The
agreements that NAFTA references, the New York Convention"' and
the Inter-American Convention, "4 are well-established multilateral
agreements that attempt to accomplish this goal.-'
Apart from these two conventions, the United States has also estab-
lished numerous other bilateral commercial treaties that allow for the en
forcement and recognition of arbitration agreements and awards."'
These treaties achieve the same goals of enforcement and recognition of
arbitration agreements and awards and apply to countries that are not
members of the New York Convention or Inter-American Convention. 2
As the United States has indicated support for international commercial
arbitration in both statutory and case law,2"' an examination of both
sources is warranted.
1. U.S. Precedent
As early as the 1850s, the United States judiciary indicated a willing-
ness to give favorable consideration to arbitration as a means of dispute
237. H.R. REP. No. 501, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990).
238. Id.
239. See iinfra notes 269-88 and accompanying text.
240. See iqfra notes 289-300 and accompanying text.
241. H.R. REP. No. 501, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990).
242. TIlE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION KIT, supra note 236, at 53. Since 1950, 18
commercial treaties have been formed to establish arbitration as a primary means of
resolving international commercial disputes. Id.; see also 2A SN IT & PECIIOTA, supra
note 236, at 2815-16 (U.S. has concluded a number of such treaties dealing with arbi-
tration). On the other hand, Mexico has not entered into any such treaties dealing
with arbitration. Id. at 2061. Rather, Mexico relies primarily on multilateral conven-
tions, such as the New York Convention and the Inter-American Convention. Id.
243. Such limited treaties "enable countries not ready to adhere to multilateral con-
ventions on arbitration to provide for enforcement and recognition of arbitration
agreements and awards." 1 SMIT & PECIIOTA, supra note 236, at 275. The use of such
limited treaties provides "flexibility" thus allowing the parties involved to tailor the
treaty to "their respective needs and stages of development." Id. at 276. They will
likely continue to be used in the international commercial arbitration field. Id.
244. Howard M. Holtzmann, The Importance oJ Choosing the Right Place to Arbi-
trate an Inteinational Case, TIlE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION KIT 119, 155 (1986).
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resolution."' Recent cases also reflect this policy, especially in cases
involving international trade."''
The scale and dynamic nature of international trade was forcefully pre
sented in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.247 In MIS Bremen, the
Supreme Court upheld the use of a forum selection clause in an interna-
tional business transaction between Zapata, a Houston-based American
corporation, and Unterweser, a German corporation." '4 The Court spe-
cifically noted the increase of international trade in the world.1i Signifi-
cantly, the Court also noted that for U.S. business to thrive in this new
environment, parties need to be given more flexibility to indicate how
they want disputes to be handled.2' The Court held that the use of the
clause at issue was an essential element of this international deal and
should be respected as it was an "effort to eliminate all uncertainty."1
25
'
245. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1854) (noting that arbitration as a mode of set-
tlement should be encouraged). Yet, this can not be said to be the prevalent view in
early American jurisprudence as "arbitration was initially viewed by U.S. courts with
suspicion, as an attempt to oust them of jurisdiction." 2A SMIT & PECIIOTA, supra
note 236, at 2813.
246. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508
F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); McCreary Tire and Rubber Co. v. CEAT, S.p.A., 501 F.2d
1032 (3d Cir. 1974); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 73 U.S. 614 (1985); Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987),
247. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
248. Id. at 2, 15.
249. Id. at 12 (businesses operate in "world markets").
250. Id. at 8-9. The specific language of the Court reads:
For at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of overseas com-
mercial activities by business enterprises based in the United States. The
barrier of distance that once tended to confine a business concern to a mod-
est territory no longer does so . . . . The expansion of American business
and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts,
we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under
our laws and in our courts . . . . We cannot have trade and commerce in
world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by
our laws, and resolved in our courts.
Id. at 9.
251. Id. at 14 n.15.
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In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.25- the Court built upon its M/S
Breman decision and looked favorably to international arbitration as a
means of obtaining certainty in international commercial dealings."" In
Scherk, a contract was established between Scherk, a German citizen,
and Alberto-Culver, an American company, whereby Alberto-Culver ob-
tained Scherk's property interests in three distinct business entities."'
The contract contained an arbitration clause stating that any disputes
would be resolved by the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris,
France.2 ' The business interests transferred were not as represented by
Sherk and a dispute arose.2" The Court upheld the arbitration agree-
ment, noting that arbitration agreements advance a strong policy by act-
ing as an "indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness
and predictability essential to any international business transaction." 
2 7
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. ," the
Supreme Court determined the validity of an arbitration clause used in
an international commercial transaction when the claim to be arbitrated
was an antitrust claim arising under the Sherman Act. ' After noting
the "fundamental importance" that antitrust law plays in America, the
Court held that such concerns were properly subject to international
arbitration.2 0 The Court stated that the "international cast of a transac-
tion... add[s] an element of uncertainty to dispute resolution" and that
international arbitration was increasingly useful to remove this uncertain-
ty." The Court noted that although international arbitration was still in
a formative stage and relatively untested, the advantages of such process
warranted its use.62 In concluding antitrust claims were properly sub-
ject to arbitration, the Court stated that "concerns of international comi-
ty, respect for the capacities of foreign and international tribunals, and
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for pre-
dictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the
parties' agreement [to arbitrate]. " s Clearly, the United States judiciary
252. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
253. Id. at 516. 519-20.
254. Id. at 508.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 509.
257. Id. at 516, 519-20.
258. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
259. Id. at 616.
260. Id. at 634, 640.
261. Id. at 636. 638.
262. Id. at 638-39.
263. Id. at 629. See generally Jill A. Pietrowski, Enjorcing hitermntional Comner-
cial Arbitration Agrecments-Post-Mitsntbishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymon th.
Inc., 36 AMl. U. L. REv. 57 (1986).
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has recognized and accepted international commercial arbitration as a
means to resolve international business disputes.
2. United States Statutes
Matters of foreign commerce and arbitration are governed by the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA) embodied in Title 9 of the United States
Code."' Where international matters are an issue, the FAA prevails over
state law."t; The FAA seeks to place arbitration on solid ground as a
legitimate means of dispute resolution."" The FAA established the Unit-
ed States general policy of favoring arbitration.
Apart from the FAA, the stability of international commercial arbitra-
tion was greatly advanced with the advent of the following two conven-
tions, both provided for in NAFTA. Prior to this time, enforcing an arbi-
tration agreement or award had to be done in local courts under "domes-
tic arbitration law."2 7 This did not lend itself to any degree of certainty
and hampered the resolution of international commercial disputes.'
264. 2A SMIT & PECIIOTA, supra note 236, at 2813. Chapter 1 was enacted in 1925,
and amended in 1947 and 1988 and lays out the general United States policy that
favors arbitration. Id. Chapter 2 was included in 1970 and acknowledges the U.S.
commitment to the New York Convention. I. See infra notes 269-88 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of New York Convention. Chapter 3 was included in 1990 and
reflects the U.S. commitment to the Inter-American Convention. 2A SMIT & PECIIOTA,
supra note 236, at 2813. See infra notes 289-300 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of Inter-American Convention.
265. 2A SMIT & PECIIOTA, supra note 236, at 2815. Some states recently enacted leg-
islation that also deals with international arbitration. Id. It is not yet clear how these
state enactments will coexist with the FAA. They may, however, apply if there is no
direct conflict with the FAA and if the state regulations "fill gaps" not in opposition
to the general thrust of the FAA. Id.
266. A House Report, commenting on the FAA before its enactment, stated:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the
bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement. Ile can
no longer refuse to perform his contract when it becomes disadvantageous to
him. An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other con-
tracts, where it belongs.
H.R. REI'. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
267. 1 SMIT & PECIIOTA, sup?'a note 236, at 230.
268. Id.
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a. Convention on the Recognition and Enjbrcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards"5
The New York Convention is codified in Chapter 2 of Title 9 of the
United States Code. " The New York Convention became the law of the
United States on December 29, 1970. 7 The United States applies this
Convention to any arbitration agreement or award arising out of a "com-
mercial" legal relationship. '72 Though the broad language of the Conven-
tion can be applied to all transactions, commercial or not, it was modi-
fied by the United States to apply only to commercial transactions.
2 7
'
269. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, New York, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. [hereinafter the
New York Convention].
270. "The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance
with this chapter." 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
271. Id. See generally Quigley, Accession by tire United States to the United Na-
tions Convention on the Recognition and E? for cnent of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961). The United States had ratified the New York Convention on
July 31, 1970. Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 1970 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News (84 Stat.) 809, 811.
272. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1988). See also RESTATEMENT (TtIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 487 (1987) (noting that the New York Convention handles legal relationships that
are "commercial in character"). However, the United States position is in the minority
as "most" states apply the Convention to "all private arbitral agreements, regardless
of the subject matter." Id. at cmt. f.
273. Article II of the New York Convention provides:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which
have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable
of settlement by arbitration.
New York Convention, supra note 269, at Article II.
In adopting the New York Convention, the United States made a reservation that
provided in part: "The United States shall apply the Convention only to differences
arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered
commercial under the national law of the United States." Id. Thus, the United States
limited the New York Convention's application to commercial transactions. However, a
reservation was not necessary for the Inter-American Convention. as its provisions
apply only to commercial transactions. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
The United States reservation limiting application of the New York Convention
was considered "compatible with the purposes of the Convention" and thus allowed. 1
SMIT & PECIIOTA, supra note 236, at 26. Only this, and one other reservation, were
deemed appropriate; all other reservations were "discouraged" as incompatible with the
goal of the New York Convention. Id. Thirty-nine other countries have also made this
reservation. Y.B. CoM. ARB. - 1993 325 n.2 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed. 1993).
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 defines a reservation as:
"[A] unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing,
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, where it purports to exclude or
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The Convention only applies to arbitration agreements or awards be-
tween a United States citizen and a foreign party.27
The district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction over
any matters arising under international treaties. Thus, any lawsuits sub-
ject to the New York Convention fall within their purview. "7 The fed-
eral courts have jurisdiction "regardless of the citizenship of the parties
or the amount in controversy.'2 7 Further, when an action relates to the
New York Convention, and it is initially filed in a state court, the lawsuit
may be removed to the federal district court at any time before trial."'
Most importantly, the codified sections provide for methods by which
arbitration can be compelled, 78 and later for confirmation of the result-
to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that
State." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
274. Section 202 of Title 9 provides:
An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely
between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the
Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisag-
es performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation
with one or more foreign states.
9 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
275. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1988). Section 203 provides that: "An action or proceeding
falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of
the United States. The district courts of the United States ... shall have original ju-
risdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount in controver-
sy." Id.
This provision naturally results from Article Ill of the Constitution. Section 1 of
Article III in part provides: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1. Section 2, clause I of Article Ill
in part provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases. in Law and Equity,
arising under ...Treaties made, or which shall be made " U.S. CONST. art. Ill,
§ 2, cl. 1.
276. RESTATEMENT (Ti[IRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 487 cmt. a. (1987).
277. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1988). The action may be removed to federal court at any time
before trial, whether or not the Convention appears applicable based on the com-
plaint. RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487 cmt. a. (1987).
278. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1988). Section 206 provides, "A court having jurisdiction under
this chapter may direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at
any place therein provided for, whether that place is within or without the United
States." Id.
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ing arbitral award. 7' A court must stay or dismiss an action should the
New York Convention mandate that the controversy be arbitrated."'
Enforcement of an arbitral award has significant import as a "matter of
international obligation." '' Accordingly, the New York Convention rec-
ognizes that such awards are binding and enforceable.' Most court de-
cisions in the United States strongly favor enforcement of international
arbitration awards upholding the "spirit of the Convention..
2
.
i. History of New York Convention
The New York Convention was adopted during a United Nations Con-
ference in mid-1958, and became effective on June 7, 1959.-8' Although
participating in the conference, the United States did not fully support
the agreement at that time; however, increasing support of the New York
Convention led the United States to accede to the Convention in early
1968. "5 The United States' adoption of the Convention was a result of
the fact that the Convention had support from numerous influential bod-
ies.' The Convention was felt to "serve the best interests of Americans
doing business abroad by encouraging them to submit their commercial
disputes to impartial arbitration for awards which could be enforced in
both U.S. and foreign courts."' 7 The New York Convention was signifi-
279. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1988). Three years after an award is obtained, an order may
be requested confirming the award. Id. The court "shall" confirm the award unless
finding a proscribed reason for refusal. Id.
280. "[A] court ...must, at the request of any party to an action, stay or dismiss
the action pending arbitration if an agreement to arbitrate falling under the Conven-
tion is in effect and covers the controversy on which the action is based." RESTATE-
MENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487(2) (1987).
281. RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 487 cmt. c. (1987). As a
matter of international obligation, enforcement of such awards are governed by feder-
al law. Id.
282. Article III of the New York Convention in part provides: "Each Contracting
State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them . New York
Convention, supra note 269, at Article III.
283. Courts have given weight to the "congressional policy, evidenced by U.S. acces-
sion to the Convention, of favoring arbitration of international commercial disputes."
2A SMIT & PECHOTA, suipra note 236, at 2842.
284. H.R. REP. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
285. The Convention was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent on April
25, 1968.
286. These parties included the "American Bar Association, the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, the American Arbitration Association, the Inter-Ameri-
can Commercial Arbitration Commission, the International Chamber of Commerce, Of-
fice and Professional Employees International Union, the Department of State, the
Department of Justice, and the Bureau of the Budget." Id.
287. Id.
1356
[Vol. 21: 1313, 1994] Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
cant in that it was one of the first efforts to promote uniformity in inter-
national commercial arbitration.'
b. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration"
The Inter-American Convention or "Panama Convention" is codified in
Chapter 3 of Title 9 of the United States Code Annotated. -' It came in-
to force in the United States on October 27, 1990." The terms of this
agreement are "substantially similar" to the New York Convention '
and, like the New York Convention, the Inter-American Convention ap-
plies only to commercial transactions."' The two conventions were "in-
tended to achieve the same results, and their key provisions adopt the
same standards.""4 The Inter-American Convention also recognizes the
binding nature of arbitral awards." In fact, the New York Convention
and Inter-American Convention were felt to be so similar that Congress
expected a "general uniformity of results" under either convention.'
This is significant as any disputes arising between a United States busi-
nessperson and a Mexican businessperson would likely be handled under
the Inter-American Convention. 7
288. Ronald A. Brand, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, I.E.L. VIII-D (January 1991).
289. Inter-American Convention on International and Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter the Inter-Ainerican Convention].
290. "The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of
January 30, 1975, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this
chapter." 9 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. 1992).
291. Id. The United States ratified the convention on August 15, 1990. The Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Pub. L. No. 101-39, 104
Stat. 675 (1990).
292. RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487 reporter's notes 2
(1987). See also H.R. REP. No. 501, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (Inter-American Con-
vention "modeled" after New York Convention).
293. Article 1 of the Inter-American Convention relates to "an agreement in which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitral decision any differences that may arise or
have arisen between them with respect to a commercial transaction is valid." Inter-
American Convention, supra note 289, at Article 1.
294. H.R. REP. No. 501, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990).
295. Article 4 of the Inter-American Convention provides in part: "An arbitral deci-
sion or award . . . shall have the force of a final judicial judgement." Inter-American
Convention, supra note 289, at Article 4.
296. H.R. REP. No. 501, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990).
297. In ratifying the Inter-American Convention, the United States made the follow-
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i. History of Inter-American Convention
The Inter-American Convention was adopted in 1975 at a conference of
the Organization of American States.a' Although the Convention was
strongly supported by the United States, it did not receive Senate advice
and consent until October 9, 1986."' The support for the Inter-American
convention was based on the fact that it was thought to provide a "de-
pendable mechanism" for resolving commercial disputes arising between
Latin American and U.S. business entities. °
The significance of the New York Convention and the Inter-American
Convention is that they provide a "clear legal basis" for enforcement of
arbitral agreements and awards, and thus add stability to international
economic relations." They operate together to form a "unified legal
framework for the fair and efficient settlement of disputes arising in
international commercial relations.":0 2
V. PRIVATE COMMERCIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER NAFTA
A. NAFTA Strives for Alternative Dispute Resolution
NAFTA encourages to "the maximum extent possible.., the use of
arbitration and other means of alternative dispute resolution for the set-
tlement of international commercial disputes between private parties in
the free trade area." In addition to arbitration, the methods available
ing reservation:
Unless there is an express agreement among the parties to an arbitration
agreement to the contrary, where the requirements for application of both the
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration and the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
are met, if a majority of such parties are citizens of a state or states that
have ratified or acceded to the Inter-American Convention and are member
states of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Convention
shall apply. In all other cases, the Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards shall apply.
9 U.S.C. § 301 (1992).
Thus, assuming no express agreement to the contrary, a dispute arising between
an American businessperson and a Mexican businessperson would be handled under
the Inter-American Convention.
298. See H.R. REP. No. 501, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Camp, Jr., supra note 223, at 723.
302. 1 SMIT & PECIIOTA, supra note 236, at 31.
303. NAFIrA, supra note 11, art. 2022.
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include negotiation, mediation, and conciliation.' These methods ar-
range themselves "along a continuum" to the degree that they differ from
typical adjudication in court systems. '  However, the methods refer-
enced all rely on consent, that is the parties involved must consent to the
process and the procedures to be utilized." Consenting to the process
establishes a "proclivity to accommodation," an essential first step in
resolving the dispute at hand. 7 Merely engaging in such efforts estab-
lishes the two sides of the dispute, and by establishing such, starts to re-
solve the matter as the two positions are then communicated and un-
derstood.' Moreover, these methods of alternative dispute resolution
have become almost "obligatory" in nature when the disputing parties
have a great deal at stake, such as an important or vital international
business deal."'
1. Conciliation"0 and Mediation""
Though not defined, NAFTA calls for the use of "other means" of dis-
pute resolution. Some commentators have interpreted that language to
304. Rief, supra note 131, at 579.
305. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1794 - 1989 vii (A.M. Stuyt ed.. 3d ed.
1990). Arbitration is the closest to typical adjudication, with mediation and concilia-
tion further removed. Id.
306. Id. at 578.
307. LILLIAN L. RANDOLPH, TIIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN TIEORY AND
PRACTICE 2 (1973).
308. Id. at 3-4.
309. Id. at 13.
310. Conciliation is defined as, "The adjustment and settlement of a dispute in a
friendly, unantagonistic manner." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 289 (6th ed. 1990). The
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law has published conciliation
rules should the businessperson seek conciliation. These rules recommend that parties
to international transactions insert the following clause in the contract: "Where, in the
event of a dispute arising out of or relating to this contract, the parties wish to seek
an amicable settlement of that dispute by conciliation, the conciliation shall take
place in accordance with the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules as at present in force."
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION KIT, supra note 236, at 266.
311. Mediation is defined as, "Private, informal dispute resolution process in which
a neutral third person, the mediator, helps disputing parties to reach an agreement.
The mediator has no power to impose a decision on the parties." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 981 (6th ed. 1990). Mediators function to: (1) reduce emotion, by depersonal-
izing a dispute, (2) promote discussion, (3) facilitate the use of confidential informa-
tion, (4) focus issues and identify interests, (5) generate new options, and (6) reduce
conflict aftermath. Phillips and Piazza, The Role of Mediation in Ptblic Interest Dis-
putes, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1231, 1234 (1983).
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mean that NAFTA encourages the use of conciliation and mediation for
resolving international commercial disputes."' However, arbitration is
the "principal means" of resolving such disputes, and conciliation and
mediation are generally seen merely as additional means to resolve con-
flicts.?"" Yet, these long-tested, informal methods"" increase under-
standing among the parties and have viable use in the international trade
context. "
These two informal methods of dispute settlement are advantageous
because they are less costly and more expeditious than other settlement
methods."' However, conciliation and mediation are limited by the fact
that they are "non-binding in effect.""7 Thus, they are fundamentally
different than arbitration, which results in a binding decision. : ' Apart
from providing a theoretical basis for the resolution of international com-
mercial disputes, these methods, conciliation and mediation, "are little
used in current practice.""'
2. Arbitration'12 as Primary Source
NAFTA specifically mentions arbitration as a means of dispute resolu-
tion in Article 2022."' Article 2022 also refers to both the New York
Convention and the Inter-American Convention.?n Thus, it would seem
NAFTA relies on arbitration as the primary source to resolve internation-
al commercial disputes.
312. See generally Tobi P. Dress, International Commercial Mediation and Concili-
ation, 10 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 569 (1988).
313. Id. at 573.
314. Conciliation has existed since the end of the First World War; mediation was
adopted at the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRATIONS, supra note 305, at xiv-xv.
315. Id. at 581.
316. Rief, supra note 131, at 634.
317. Id. at 580.
318. Id. at 581. See also REDFERN & HUNTER, slpra note 224, at 5-6. Arbitrators are
"to decide the dispute, not to act as mediators or conciliators." Id. at 17 n.69.
319. Id. at 21.
320. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY defines arbitration in part as:
A process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party (arbitrator)
renders a decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity
to be heard . . .An arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of
selected persons in some dispute matter, instead of carrying it to established
tribunals of justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the
expense and vexation of ordinary litigation.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990).
321. NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 2022(1).
322. Id. art. 2022(3).
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Arbitration has been argued to be the most appropriate method to
resolve disputes in trade relations between Mexico and the United States.
Increasing trade between Mexico and the United States will inevitably
lead to a "corresponding increase in private commercial disputes," and
binding arbitration offers the best solution.:" The necessity for a defini-
tive and binding resolution procedure for private commercial disputes is
especially clear in this relationship due to the great differences in the
legal systems of the two countries.-' Well-versed businesspeople in-
volved in United States and Mexican trade have turned "with increasing
frequency" to binding arbitration as the most efficient means to resolve
international commercial disputes.
2 1
The vast differences in the legal systems in the United States and Mex-
ico create uncertainty for the businessperson which must be lessened if
trade is to flourish. Binding arbitration provides the means to reduce the
uncertainty.
B. NAFTA Dispute Resolution Provisions Applied to
Trade with Mexico
Mexico has long recognized arbitration as a legitimate means of dis-
pute settlement.121 In Mexico, commercial law is within the jurisdiction
323. Camp, Jr., supra note 223, at 718.
324. The legal systems differ at their most fundamental level. Id. at 720. The United
States common law legal system relies on the process of stare decisis by which law
is created through the process of deciding cases. Id. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines
stare decisis as: "To abide by, or adhere to. decided cases." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1406 (6th ed. 1990). On the other hand, the Mexican legal system, a civil system,
relies on extensive codes, which are applied as necessary to situations that arise.
Camp, Jr., supra note 223, at 718. Because the process by which legal issues are ad-
dressed is fundamentally different, it necessarily affects the resolution of disputes. Id.;
see also Frederick R. Anderson & Claudio Grossman, Lawyers and the Rate of Law
in the Western Hemisphere, in INVESTMENT AND TRADE IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE,
MEXICO AND VENEZUELA 191 n.13 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Handbook Series
1992) (stating that civil law does "not recognize" stare decisis).
325. Fagan & Arreola, supra note 30, at 804-05. The factors favoring international
arbitration are: (1) predictability: the dispute will be resolved impartially, not by
courts of one or the other nation, (2) competence: the arbitrators will likely have
applicable knowledge and expertise of the matter at issue, (3) party participation: the
parties engaged in the business deal can shape how the process will occur, (4) finali-
ty: the decision rendered should be final and not subject to attack, (5) enforceability:
the award should be enforceable in courts in either the United States or Mexico, and
(6) cost: the cost of arbitration arguably is less than that of full litigation in national
court systems. Id.
326. 2A SMITII & PECIIOTA, supra note 236, at 2059. One of the oldest codes of
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* of the Mexican Congress; arbitration of commercial disputes is therefore
subject to federal law.' Mexican federal law is the exclusive law in the
enforcement of foreign and international awards.""
Mexico has continued its leadership role of Latin Americae " in the
field of international commercial arbitration.""' Mexico is party to both
the New York Convention"' and the Inter-American Convention.12 Ar-
ticle 133 of the Mexican Constitution requires that treaties to which Mex-
ico is a party are the "law of the land.":" Thus, both the New York Con-
vention"'4 and the Inter-American convention are part of Mexican
law, ' and international commercial arbitration can proceed under ei-
ther.
International commercial arbitration is a viable alternative in Mexico,
especially due to recent reforms in the legal structure."" Mexico has
arbitral institutions, a number of experienced arbitrators, and facilities;
however, Mexico is still rather inexperienced in the field of international
commercial arbitration.' 7 Thus, although arbitration can be performed
Spanish law, in existence since 1171, which later became part of Mexican law stated:
"No man ought to be a judge, except one ... agreed upon by the parties." Id. The
constitutional origin of arbitration in Mexico traces back as far as 1824 in article 156
of the Mexican constitution. Id.
327. Id.
328. As international relations comes within the "exclusive sphere" of the federal
government's power, only federal law applies to these type of awards. 2A SMIT &
PECIIOTA, supra note 236, at 2075.1.
329. A major movement that facilitated the resolution of disputes in Latin American
was the establishment of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission.
JOIN T. VANCE & HELEN L. CLAGE'Ir, A GUIDE TO TIlE LAW AND LEGAL LITERATURE OF
MEXICO 101 (1945).
330. Alexander C. Hoagland, Modification of Mexican Arbitration Law, J. INT'L
ARB., Mar. 1990, at 91.
331. Mexico ratified the convention effective June 1, 1973. Camp, Jr., supra note
223, at 723 n.18.
332. Mexico signed and ratified the convention in 1978. Camp, Jr., supra note 223.
at 723 n.23.
333. Hoagland, supra note 330, at 92.
334. Unlike the United States, Mexico did not make a reservation to the New York
Convention. 2A SMITH & PECIIOTA, supra note 236. at 2075.2. Thus, Mexico would
arguably enforce awards that did not deal solely with "commercial" matters. Id. See
supra note 273 and accompanying text for discussion of the United States reservation
to the New York Convention.
335. Hoagland, supra note 330, at 92. See also 2A SMIT & PECIIOTA, supra note 236,
at 2060 (stating that "treaties duly entered are part of the supreme law of Mexico
and supersede conflicting provisions of domestic law").
336. The attorney general of Mexico, Jorge Carpizio. recently established a specific
arbitration group. Solis, supra note 20, at Al. Additionally, Mexico's commercial code
was reworked in an attempt to "streamline arbitration." Id.
337. Hoagland, supra note 330, at 93, 99. Additionally, it is noted that the reforns
in the Mexican arbitration process will not "cover all business disputes." Solis, supra
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within Mexico using such institutions, the facilities available are not as
fully developed as elsewhere." More significant than the seeming inex-
perience, Mexico still harbors a degree of hostility toward arbitration as
a judicial method that has been "imposed upon them"; this hostility must
be dispelled before arbitration in Mexico will be seen as a favorable
alternative for a foreign businessperson. ' Thus, if international com-
mercial arbitration is used, it would be more appropriate to arbitrate
elsewhere, and only look for enforcement of any potential award in Mex-
ico.:-
As discussed previously, the United States favors arbitration and has
embraced its use in international trade. The Mexican businessman could
look for favorable treatment in carrying out an arbitration agreement in
the United States or having an award enforced therein. While the United
States has felt it desirable to adopt an international approach to arbitra-
tion of trade disputes, this might not be the case for Mexico." What
one country views as an appropriate international policy related to inter-
national commercial arbitration might "differ enormously" from the poli-
cy adopted by another country."" In fact, the large differences in
Mexican and American culture and history have naturally resulted in dif-
ferent legal systems in the two countries."" However, by merely acced-
note 20, at Al.
338. Camp, Jr., supra note 223, at 731 n.56.
339. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 224, at 120.
340. Contra KARL-HEINZ BOCKSTIEGEL, ARBITRATION AND STATE ENTERPRISES 53 (1984)
(indicating that, as a matter of deference and consideration, arbitration should be
done in the developing country, Mexico in this instance).
341. This follows from the definition of international law:
International law is not law in its usually defined sense . . . . It is merely a
body of rules established in custom or by treaty by which the intercourse be-
tween civilized nations is governed . . . . Obedience to it is voluntary only
and can not be enforced by a common sovereign power. Any nation has the
power and the right to dissent, from a rule or principle of international law,
even though it is accepted by all the other nations.
REPERTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL JUIIISI'RtDEN('E, VOLIME I 1794 - 1918 3 (Vincent
Coussirat-Coustere & Pierre Michel Eisemann eds. 1989).
342. International Commercial Arbitration and International Public Policy, supra
note 236. at 377.
343. JAMEs E. HERGERT & JORGE CAMIL, AN INTRODUCTION TO TIlE MEXICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM i (1978). See also Fitch, supra note 35. at 375 (Mexico and United States
have "differing interests and a significant disparity in . . . needs"). See generally Wil-
liam Bridge, A Different Legal System: Civil Law (Mexico) and Common Law (Unit-
ed States), DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO: VOLUME 1 1-1 (Susan K. Lefler ed. 1987).
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ing to the New York and Inter-American Conventions, Mexico has indi-
cated a willingness to have private commercial disputes resolved by in-
ternational standards embodied in the agreements, rather than standards
adopted by its own government.""' Mexico will most likely abide by the
terms of the conventions in most circumstances.
Despite the potential misgivings of an American businessperson of
doing business in Mexico, international commercial arbitration remains
the most effective device when dealing with "countries where major trad
ing is relatively recent, such as between... industrialized and developing
economies.""n' In fact, given the dramatic differences between the Unit-
ed States and Mexico, arbitration is arguably the general rule in inter-
national business dealings between the two.:"'
1. Mexican Case Law
Corresponding to the trend in the United States, the Mexican judiciary
has moved toward supporting arbitration.' 7 In general, however, rela-
tively little has been published in English about how the Mexican legal
system operates. 8 While the Mexican judicial system keeps a record of
decisions, it generally does not publish the decisions."' Yet, some deci-
sions do exist that highlight how an arbitration proceeding might be han
dled in Mexico.""
344. De Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for
National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REv. 42, 43 (1982). In agreeing to the New York Conven-
tion and the Inter-American Convention, Mexico has bound itself by the principle of
pacta sunt servanda. Pacta sunt servanda is the fundamental principle underlying
treaties and provides that treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed
by them in good faith. HARRIS, supra note 69, at 762. This principle is embodied in
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
345. Holtzmann, supra note 244, at 128.
346. "[Alrbitration clauses are the almost universal practice in commercial contracts
between parties from different social, economic, and legal systems, because arbitra-
tion is seen to be the best available bridge between those who approach contract
disputes from divergent cultural perspectives." Id.
347. Fagan & Arreola, supra note 30, at 813.
348. HERGET & CAMIL, supra note 343, at i.
349. Id. at 77. "[Tjhere is no attempt to report in a systematic or comprehensive
manner." Id. Because, under Mexico's civil law system "courts do not make law," a
detailed system of reporting cases is not considered necessary. Id. For a discussion
of how the Mexican system differs from the United States system in following case
law precedent, see supra note 324 and accompanying text.
350. These are summarized or "extracted" decisions, however, lessening their value
as research tool. HERGERT & CAAIIL, supra note 343, at 77.
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In Presse Office v. Centro Editorial Hoy, S.A.,35' a French company
(Presse) granted a Mexican company (Centro) an exclusive license to
distribute a Spanish edition of a French magazine."" Both parties
agreed that any controversy arising from the deal would be submitted to
arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris,
France." A controversy did arise, the matter was submitted to the ICC,
and a final award was rendered in favor of Presse." ' Over the request
of Centro for judicial relief to avoid payment of the award, the enforce-
ment of the award in Mexico was authorized.:w
In Malden Hills, Inc. v. Hilaturas Lourdes, S.A., a Mexican court
again enforced an arbitration award against a Mexican company,
Hilaturas." Malden Hills, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation, had a writ-
ten contract with Hilaturas for purchase of cotton.' Both had agreed
that disputes would be resolved by arbitration." Hilaturas did not sup-
ply cotton according to the terms of the contract, upon which Malden
Hills filed an arbitration complaint, and was granted a final award for
damages.," Again, over objections by the Mexican company, the Higher
Court of Appeals in Mexico permitted the enforcement of the award.""
Both decisions indicate that Mexico has been willing to recognize and
enforce arbitration agreements and awards relating to international com-
mercial disputes.
C. Challenges to Arbitration
As noted above, effective arbitration brings stability to international
trade, thus facilitating such trade. However, the success of arbitration
351. 4 Y.B. COM. ARB. 301 (1979) (extract of decision). See also DOING BUSINESS IN
MEXICO: STATUTORY VOLUME F4-1 (1987)[hereinafter DOING BUSINESS]. The Yearbook of
Commercial Arbitration, in which the extract was found, publishes a yearly report in
English of different countries' court decisions on application of the New York Con-
vention. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 224, at 46 n.84.
352. DOING BUSINESS, supra note 351, at F4-1.
353. Id.
354. Id. at F4-1 to F4-2.
355. Id. at F4-2.
356. 4 Y.B. Cohi. ARB. 302 (1979) (extract of decision). See also DOING BUSINESS,
supra note 351, at F3-1.
357. DOING BUSINESS, supra note 351, at F3-1.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at F3-1 to F3-2.
361. Id. at F3-2.
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turns on its stability and depends on whether the respective governments
involved deem the process worthy. If national governments do not give
adequate assurance that the arbitration process will be respected, inter-
national commercial arbitration will be ineffective.
IT]he success of the process [arbitration of commercial disputes] depends on the
willingness of a state ... to allow for neutral arbitration in the first place. At var-
ious stages in the arbitral process, a national judiciary can, and often does, im-
pose its will or its own notions of "fairness" and "justice" on the parties and the
process. This may occur at the .outset when determining which issues, if any, are
arbitrable, during the process itself when determining the correctness of certain
procedures and the powers to be accorded to the arbitrators, and finally at the
conclusion of the process when determining whether and/or to what extent the
award will be enforced.:"
The advent of the conventions referenced by NAFTA have not fully
removed "the influence of separate national policies on the arbitral pro-
cess." However, the New York Convention and the Inter-American
Convention are a step in the right direction in attempting a truly interna-
tional approach which provides some distance from the "vagaries of dif-
ferent national legal systems."' Although these conventions place inter-
national obligations on member nations, their application in any particu-
lar instance will always be a "matter of national law and courts." '
Both the New York Convention and the Inter-American Convention list
a defined set of exceptions under which an arbitral award could be re-
fused from recognition and enforcement.' The exceptions can be
broadly classified into two categories: (1) those which are requested by
the defendant in the enforcement proceeding 7 and (2) those which the
362. International Commercial Arbitration and International Public Policy, supra
note 236, at 372-73. Arbitration can be hampered by national governments in that:
"[Niational policies may affect the arbitral process significantly in such fundamental
areas as the matter that may be submitted to arbitration and the enforcement of the
ultimate awards. In short, nations do not and will not easily relinquish their influ-
ence in the resolution of disputes taking place on their territories." Id. (emphasis
added).
363. Id. at 374.
364. Id. at 375.
365. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 224. at 7.
366. These exceptions are contained in Article V of the New York Convention and
Article 5 of the Inter-American Convention. Both sources list the same seven instanc-
es in which recognition and enforcement might be precluded. See generally RESTATE-
MENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 487-88 (1987).
367. This broad category includes five exceptions:
(1) [I]ncapacity of the parties or invalidity of the arbitration agreement;
(2) violation of due process; (3) an award outside the scope of the arbitra-
tion agreement; (4) irregularity in the composition of the arbitral tribunal or
the arbitral procedure; and (5) an award not binding, set aside, or suspended.
1 SMIT & PECIIOTA, supra note 236, at 28.
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court considers on its own motion."' These exceptions are specifically
defined and documented, and a businessperson well-versed in interna-
tional trade would most likely be aware of their implications. This Com-
ment will instead focus on those particular challenges that may be assert-
ed when trade occurs between a private party and a state or state entity.
As opposed to the seven defined exceptions of the New York and Inter-
American Conventions, these defenses are not listed and the businessper-
son might not be aware of their use. The end result is that while con-
ventions referenced by NAIFTA add a degree of certainty to international
trade, they do not answer "[tihe question of whether a state or its agency
of instrumentality can successfully invoke a plea of state immunity." 9
Unique challenges exist when proceeding under the rubric of a "state
contract." A state contract are those contracts linking together a state or
public authority with a foreign private person" Such contracts are be-
coming increasingly prevalent as more states become involved in eco-
nomic activities.37 ' Any time a state enterprise372 is involved, a question
arises whether the state enterprise may claim an immunity.7" In fact,
this challenge is "frequently invoked" and by a number of different gov-
ernmental entities. 7 By the very fact of being a sovereign nation, the
368. This includes two exceptions: "(1) the subject matter of the dispute is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the country where enforcement
is sought; or (2) recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country." Id. at 29.
369. 1 SIIT & PEcIIOTA, supra note 236, at 25. For a full discussion of sovereign
immunity, see infta notes 381-99 and accompanying text.
370. Abbott, supra note 100.
371. Centre for Studies and Research in International Law and International Rela-
tions, TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND STATE CONTRACTS 84 (1987). In the formation
of GATT, this was noted to be a problem because of "differing conceptions of the
proper role of government in the economy." Abbott, supira note 100.
372. NAFTA defines a state enterprise as "an enterprise that is owned, or controlled
through ownership interests, by a Party." NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 201.
373. BOCKSTIEGEL, supra note 340, at 39. Three issues impact the determination of
whether an immunity exists. First, does the state enterprise have a separate legal
existence apart from the state. Second, if so, is it a public entity or entity function-
ing in a private capacity. Finally, and most importantly, does the dispute involve com-
mercial activities. This last fact is of paramount import because, in the "malority of
international contracts and arbitration disputes with states and state enterprises," such
a finding of commercial activity will preclude an immunity defense. Id.; see infra
notes 382-84, 393, and accompanying text.
374. MAURO RUIBINO-SAMMARTANO. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW 119 (1990).
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state has some "prerogatives" unavailable to the individual businessper-
son, which can often result in "one-sided consequences.""
Many commentators have highlighted the instances in which enforce-
ment of an arbitration award against a state enterprise or state was pre-
cluded. : " Even if the award will ultimately be granted, in dealing with
states and state enterprises, it "may be more difficult in fulfilling the
arbitration awards.""" Most significantly, the private party cannot resort
to international law for support."'7
Succinctly stated, a private party can not fully rely on equity while en
gaging in a business deal with a foreign government. In fact, the most
significant cause of "uncertainty" in the international trading realm re-
sults from the "self-serving actions of self-interested nation-states."' By
refusing to recognize or enforce an arbitration agreement or award, the
foreign government "can deprive the arbitration of any practical impor-
tance.""' Therefore, assertion of the sovereign immunity defense less-
ens or removes any benefits originally accruing to international arbitra-
tion.
1. Immunity of States and State Entities
Generally, the immunity of states from the jurisdiction of the courts of
another state is an "undisputed principle of customary international
law." " a This principle had no exceptions until the twentieth century."'
However, in the early 1950s, the United States adopted, by practice, an
exception to such immunity when a state party was engaged in commer-
375. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 305. at viii.
376. Id. at 49.
377. Id. In general, an arbitration award will be slower in coming when dealing
with a state enterprise. Id. This could be due to the time-consuming decision-making
process within a state enterprise, the need to obtain authorization from the state
before fulfilling the award, or an active intent to delay or avoid the award due to a
lack of funds either by the enterprise or the state. Id.
378. "A dispute between a State and a foreigner is, in general, not in the domain of
international law." SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 305, at vii.
379. WINIIAM, su pro note 34, at 21.
380. Danilowicz, supra note 222, at 237.
381. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § IV, ch. 5, subch. A (1987).
See, e.g., Berrizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); The Schooner Exch. v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
382. RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § IV, ch. 5, subch. A (1987).
As states became increasingly more engaged in commercial activities, such an abso-
lute immunity was thought undesirable. Id. It deprived the private party of judicial
remedies and secured an unfair competitive advantage to the state in engaging in
such commercial activities. Id.
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cial activities." This practice was administered by the State Depart-
ment'
This principle of removing sovereign immunity when the sovereign was
engaged in commercial activities had been recognized long ago.' The
fact that a state is party to a deal does not automatically remove the
commercial nature of the transaction.' Yet, the mere fact that a state
is involved in the transaction makes it easier for the state to argue that
the deal is not commercial in nature.
:1
7
383. Id. In 1952, the State Department removed the absolute immunity to jurisdic-
tion with publication of a Department of State Bulletin authored by Jack B. Tate, the
Acting Legal Adviser to the Department of State. Id. Thereafter, United States courts
adopted this approach as well. Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 69 (1965). What constitutes "commercial activity" thus become im-
portant. The United Nations, in promoting the Model Law on International Commer-
cial Arbitration indicates that a commercial activity should be defined as broadly as
follows:
The term "commercial" should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover
matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether con-
tractual or not. Relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not
limited to, the following transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or
exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial representa-
tion of or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engi-
neering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation
agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or busi-
ness co-operation; carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, art. I n.2 (U.N.
Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law 1985). This model was adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade on June 21, 1985. Id.
384. After the Tate pronouncement, decisions on sovereign immunity were funnelled
through the State Department. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 69 reporter's note 1 (1965). As such, concerns of foreign policy were weighed in
the equation, resulting in a granting of immunity when a strict interpretation of the
new doctrine would not call for it. See, e.g., Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.
1974); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). This policy of fun-
neling the issue through political channels resulted in a "pervasive absence of consis-
tency and clarity in the application of sovereign immunity." Thomas M. DiBiagio, Fed
eral Jurisdiction over Foreign Govern ments for Violations of Inlernational Law:
Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Alien Tort Stalnte After Amerada Hess Ship-
ping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 12 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 153. 158 (1988).
385. "If a monarch establishes a mercantile business in a foreign country, he carries
no exemption from the law of the land along with him, but is simply subject to the
general laws of the land." REPERTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL JURISPRUDENCE, sit-
pra note 341, at 134.
386. "That a government is a party to a transaction does not destroy its commercial
character." RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487 cml. f. (1987).
387. GERALD AKSEN & ROBERT B. VON MEIIREN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION BETWEEN
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a. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) :
The bill establishing the FSIA, H.R. 11315, was proposed to determine
how an action should be maintained against a foreign state.) ' Given the
increasing frequency with which states were becoming involved in com-
mercial business, the bill was deemed "urgently needed.""' The claim of
sovereign immunity by the foreign state invoked "considerable uncertain-
ty" on the part of the private litigant, who could not be assured that the
issue presented would be decided on the merits or "on the basis of non-
legal considerations through the foreign government's intercession. '
The FSIA removed the examination of a claim of sovereign immunity
from the State Department and placed it in the United States judicial sys
tem. ' Pursuant to the FSIA, "[S tates are not immune from the jurisdic-
tion of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are con-
cerned."" : Foreign states include any political subdivision or "agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state."" The FSIA removes immunity for
commercial acts arising under three scenarios." Furthermore, commer-
cial activity embodies "either a regular course of commercial conduct or
a particular commercial transaction or act."' Courts of a significant
number of countries have chosen to embrace a wide range of business
transactions under this definition." As this definition implies, it is the
underlying nature of the business deal that must be examined, and not,
PRIVATE PARTIES AND GOVERNMENTS 98 (1983). This argument is supported by the
assertion that any contract to which a State is party involves a public act of "funda-
mental national interest." Id. This assertion has considerable force in contracts with
third-world states, such as Mexico. Id.
388. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
389. H.R. 11315, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1976). During discussions related to the
bill, an increasing frequency of contacts between United States citizens and "foreign
states and entities owned by foreign states" was noted. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. "Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts
of the United States and of the states in conformity with the principles set forth in
this Chapter." FSIA, supra note 388, at sect. 1602. See also New England Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 124
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
393. 28 U.S.C § 1602 (1988).
394. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1988).
395. The scenarios are as follows: (1) commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state, (2) an act occurring in the United States that is connect-
ed to commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere, or (3) an act occurring
outside the United States in connection with foreign commercial activity that has a
direct effect within the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
396. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
397. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 224, at 15.
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for example, the ultimate use of the goods purchased.;' A wide range
of activities would be encompassed bythis definition.""
b. Act of State doctrine
Separate and apart from a claim of sovereign immunity lies the Act of
State doctrine. This doctrine was developed in Underhill v.
Hernandez,"' in which the Supreme Court stated: "Every sovereign
State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within is own territory.'. This doc-
trine exists apart from that of sovereign immunity and the FSIA was not
meant to deal with such a claim."' Under this doctrine, courts in the
United States will not examine foreign state actions that are purely pub-
lic, noncommercial actions in nature.40" States often invoke both the
sovereignty defense as well as the Act of State doctrine,"' and courts
often consider the two together.' 5 Most significant, the Act of State
398. H.R. 11315, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 16 (1976). For example, the fact that the pur-
chase of goods will ultimately be used for some public purpose does not lessen the
commercial nature of the transaction. Id. "Thus, a contract by a foreign government
to buy provisions or equipment for its armed forces or to construct a government
building constitutes commercial activity." Id. The FSIA provides: "The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course
of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."
28 U.S.C § 1603(d) (1988).
399. "Activities such as a foreign government's sale of a service or product, its
leasing of property, its borrowing of money, its employment or engagement of labor-
ers, clerical staff or public relations or marketing agents, or its investment in a secu-
rity of an American corporation" would all fall within such definition. H.R. 11315,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976).
400. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
401. Id. at 252.
402. In many instances after a sovereign immunity claims has been rejected, the
state will then assert an act of state claim. H.R. 11315, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 n.1
(1976).
403. "[Clourts in the United States will generally refrain from examining the validity
of a taking by a foreign state or property within its own territory, or from sitting in
judgment on other acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state within
its own territory and applicable there." RESTATEMENT (Tittttn) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 443 (1987).
404. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba. 425 U.S. 682
(1976).
405. However, while many courts discuss the two "interchangeably," they are funda-
mentally different. Steven R. Ratner, Intei-national Tin Council v. Amialgamet Inc.
1371
doctrine provides another potential defense for states or state entities in-
volved in international commercial dealings.
2. Challenges to Arbitration and Mexico
United States caselaw provides some guidance and discussion of the
issues that arise when maintaining an action against Mexico or one of its
numerous state instrumentalities." In Sugarnnan v. Aeromexico,"7 the
Third Circuit had to determine whether Aeromexico, the national airline
of Mexico, could properly assert a claim of sovereign immunity."8 In
this case, Sugarman, a United States citizen claimed negligence on the
part of Aeromexico in having to wait 15 hours for a flight that was to
depart from Mexico to New York City."' The court concluded that the
activities of Aeromexico constituted "commercial activities" under the
FSIA and thus removed Aeromexico's immunity."' The court noted that
524 N.YS. 2d 971, 82 AN. J. INT'L L. 837, 839 (1988). Sovereign immunity relies on
international law and is a jurisdictional defense; the Act of State doctrine rests on
principles of U.S. constitutional law and comity and is an affirmative defense. Id. The
Act of State doctrine attempts to "avoid disrespect for foreign states." RESTATEMENT
(TiIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 443 cmt. a. (1987). "To permit the validity of
the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the
courts of another would very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between gov-
ernments and vex the peace of nations." Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,
304 (1918). However, in Alfred Dunhill Inc., the Court did bring the two closer to-
gether by suggesting an exception to the act of state doctrine when the foreign state
is involved in a purely commercial act. Alfred Dunhill Inc., 425 U.S. at 695-706. This
would be analogous to the commercial act exception under the FSIA. See supra note
393 and accompanying text.
406. See Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528. 530 (5th Cir.) (suit
against Petroleos Mexicanos, PEMEX, the national oil company of Mexico), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 413 (1992); Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co.
(PEMEX), 767 F.2d 1140, 1143 (5th Cir. 1985) (suit against PEMEX and others);
Rapoport v. Banco Mexicano Somex, S.A., 668 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1982) (suit
against nationalized bank of Mexico); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz,
649 F.2d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1981) (suit against shipyard owned and operated by
Republic of Mexico); Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270, 270 (3d Cir. 1980)
(suit against Aeromexico, the "national airline of Mexico"); Southern Seas Navigation
Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos of Mexico City, 606 F. Supp. 692, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(suit against PEMEX).
407. 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980).
408. Sugarman, 626 F.2d at 271. Other cases involving state entities have also in-
volved claims of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Rapoport, 668 F.2d at 668; Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 649 F.2d at 1269, 1272 (claim of sovereign immunity, though not de-
cided in the case).
409. Suga-man, 626 F.2d at 273, 273 n.5. Plaintiff further claimed suffering "cardiac
insufficiency, angina, and arrhythmia" as well as various other physical and mental
anguish. Id. at 271.
410. Id. at 272.
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the operation of an airline entails a "regular course of commercial con-
duct" and as the flight was returning to the United States, such activity
constituted activity within the United States."' Most significant, the
court concluded its interpretation of the FSIA coincided with legislative
history, and its decision supported the goals of the FSIA.12
Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican National Oil Co.,
(PEMEX)"' involved the validity of arbitration clauses in international
transactions as well as claims of sovereign immunity." ' Sedco, Inc.
owned a drilling vessel operating in the Gulf of Mexico under charter to
Perforaciones Marinas del Golfo, S.A. (Permargo); Permargo was under
contract to drill oil wells for PEMEX, the national oil company of Mexi-
co."' A "massive blowout" occurred on June 3, 1979, causing one of the
worst oil spills in history.4 " Sedco, Inc. defended itself by asserting an
indemnity clause that stated Permargo would assume all responsibility
for such occurrences."7 However, Permargo refused to defend Sedco,
upon which Sedco filed suit against Permargo and PEMEX."" PEMEX
was dismissed based on a claim of sovereign immunity.""
The claim was then solely between Sedco and Permargo and resolu-
tion of the dispute was based upon the interpretation of the charter
agreement signed between the two. 2 ' In the charter agreement, the par-
ties had stipulated that any dispute arising would be submitted to arbi-
tration in New York."' The court noted that Sedco was a Texas compa-
411. Id. at 272, 272 n.4, 273.
412. Id. at 273-74. The court noted that the "Tate letter" signaled a significant
change in the United States position on sovereign immunity, hi. at 273. The court,
citing the Tate letter with approval, noted that the removal of immunity for commer-
cial acts was made "necessary [as] a practice which will enable persons doing busi-
ness with them [states] to have their rights determined in the courts." Id. at 274.
413. 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1985).
414. Id. at 1142-46.
415. Id. at 1143.
416. Id. The damages were contained in March of 1980 when the oil well was final-
ly capped. Id. at 1143 n.6.
417. Id. at 114344. The indemnity clause in part stated that Permargo would "as-
sume all responsibility for ... and to protect, and indemnify and hold harmless the
owner [Sedco ... from loss or damage arising from pollution or contamination,
regardless of cause and without regard to the negligence of any party." Id. at 1143-
44.





ny, and Permargo was a Mexican company; the two countries represent-
ed were both signatories of the New York Convention."' The court held
that the dispute should properly be compelled to go to arbitration as the
arbitration agreement fell "squarely" within the terms of the New York
Convention."''
Most significantly, the court posited some general guidelines as to
arbitration agreements and their interpretation. First, the court noted
that when an arbitration agreement is present, there is a presumption
that arbitration should proceed unless strong evidence indicates the dis-
pute was not imagined to be covered by the clause or agreement. 2' The
court further asserted that as a "general rule" if an arbitration clause is
at issue, "the court should construe the clause in favor of arbitration."
4 5
Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos4 ' presents the two basic
challenges to jurisdiction, foreign sovereign immunity4 27 and the Act of
State doctrine.' Arriba, a Bahamian corporation with its principal
place of business in the United States filed suit for a failed contract
against Pemex, the nationalized oil company of Mexico.2 ' The dispute
arose out of a single transaction negotiated in 1984 by Bill Flanigan, later
Arriba's president, by which Pemex was to sell Arriba a minimum of 6
million barrels of Pemex's residual oil.4"' Never having received any oil,
Arriba sued and obtained a $92 million default judgment in June 1985 in
a Texas state court, followed by a subsequent $273 million default judg-
ment plus punitive damages.':" Still without satisfaction, Arriba brought
yet another action in a federal district court in May of 1990.432
422. Id. See supra notes 269-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the New
York Convention.
423. Sedco, Inc., 767 F.2d at 1150. In arriving at this holding, the court looked to
the "tone of the [arbitration] clause as a whole." Id. at 1145 n.10. The court noted
that if "broadly" written, most disputes should be handled by an arbitration agree-
ment. Id.
424. Id. at 1145.
425. Id.
426. 962 F.2d 528 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 413 (1992).
427. This remains the "principal obstacle" to enforcement of arbitration. AKSEN &
MEIIREN, supra note 386, at 46-47.
428. Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 528. Though raising both
issues, the case only examined the foreign sovereign immunity claim as the Act of
State claim became moot by the decision. Id. at 528 n.1.
429. Id. at 530. Pemex was "relative newcomer" to the litigation, having been sued
for the first time in 1990. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 530-32.
432. Id. at 532.
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals began by noting the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act (FSIA)40: sets forth the "sole and exclusive stan-
dards" by which to resolve sovereign immunity issues in federal and state
courts." The court then proceeded to note various exceptions to FSIA,
invoking the major exception of "commercial activity."' The court not-
ed that "great latitude" is afforded when determining what constitutes
"commercial activity."'
When proceeding under the FISA, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the defendant is an agent of the sovereign."" The court in
Arriba Ltd. found Arriba's claim deficient in this respect, as Arriba failed
to show any actions by Pemex which indicated that Pemex had acted as
a principal in the deal.4" The court had previously established Pemex as
an undisputed "foreign government instrumentality,""' but found that
Arriba failed to show that Pemex was a party to the original agree-
ment " The court finally rested its conclusion on "judicial comity," not-
ing that it is necessary in an increasingly global economy, and that allow-
ing such charges to proceed in American courts "could seriously impede
our relations with Mexico.""' Thus, applying the FSIA, the court held
that there was no jurisdiction over the defendant." In this instance,
Pemex's assertion of sovereign immunity precluded an American busi-
nessman from obtaining redress.
433. See supra note 388-89 and accompanying text.
434. A-riba Ltd., 962 F.2d at 532.
435. Id. at 533.
436. Id. However, the court also noted there must be a material connection be-
tween the cause of action and the commercial acts of the sovereign, thus precluding
actions on isolated or unrelated commercial actions by a foreign sovereign. Id. This
limiting language seems to go against the "wide interpretation" favored by the
UNICTRAL Model Law. See supra note 383 and accompanying text. This Model Law
has considerable weight as the United Nations General Assembly, by resolution, urged
"all States to give due consideration" to the Model Law. Brand, supra note 288.
437. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d
438, 447 (D.C.Cir. 1990); Hester Int'l Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 879 F.2d
170, 176 (5th Cir. 1989). In Arriba Ltd., the Court of Appeals noted the District
Court had improperly place such burden on the defendant, that is to prove it was
not an agent of the sovereign. Arriba Ltd., 962 F.2d at 534 n.8.
438. Ariba Ltd., 962 F.2d at 536.
439. Id. at 533.
440. Id. at 536.
441. Id. at 537.
442. Id. at 539.
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The problem of state immunity would appear limited as it occurs "only
in such cases of commercial arbitration where one of the parties is a
State or State-owned enterprise engaged in commercial activities.""'
Yet, even when only asserted in limited circumstances, the consequences
are dramatic to the private party.4" The fact that inequality exists be-
tween the participants gives rise to "legal complications" not obvious to
the unwary.' A defense of State immunity can counter a valid arbitra-
tion clause.446 In fact, a party cannot rest solely on an arbitration clause
in the long term because the only instance in which a foreign state will
refrain advancing the sovereign immunity defense is when the defense
"ruins [the state's] credit, thus losing more than it can reasonably hope
to win by going back on its word." 47 However, this is little consolation
to a private party who must then try to determine whether the govern-
ment will keep its word or find it more beneficial to invoke a sovereign
immunity defense.
Mexico has a long history of intensive government intervention in busi
ness affairs.44 In fact, "many legal entities which are private corpora-
tions in the United States are federal governmental bodies in Mexico....
Mexico has chosen to protect its "strategic industries" by keeping the
petroleum sector, electricity, and railroads under government control."
The Mexican government has ties to various other industries as well.4 '
443. Ignaz Seidl-lHohenveldern, Cominercial Arbitration and State Immunity, in IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION: A ROAD TO WORLD-WIDE COOPERATION 87, 87 (Martin
Domke ed., 1958).
444. Although a State may be inclined to arbitrate a dispute with another State,
when a state deals with a private party, the State is no longer dealing with an
"equal" and may be more inclined to "entrench" itself behind a defense of sovereign-
ty. TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND STATE CONTRACTS, supra note 371, at 81.
445. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 305, at xii.
446. TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND STATE CONTRACTS, supra note 371, at 92. "In
all cases" in which a State contracts with a private person, there exists the risk that
the State might attempt to utilize a defense of sovereign immunity. Id. at 87. See also
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 305, at xiii. Some commentators
believe the defense has been vastly over-utilized and argue for the elimination or
significant reduction of the defense. BOCKSTIEGEL. supra note 339, at 53.
447. TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND STATE CONTRACTS, supra note 371.
448. HERGERT & CAMIL, supra note 343, at 65. The nationalization of the petroleum
industry in 1938 stands as a major "milestone" in this process of government inter-
vention. Id.
449. Id. at 72. This can cover "railroads, electric power, airlines, gasoline, [and]
hospitals." Id.
450. See generally Mexico Should Privatize or Liberalize Strategic Industries, Mex-
ican Scholar Says, BNA INT'L BUS. DAILY, Mar. 16, 1992. These industries are protect-
ed by the Mexican Constitution. Id. Accord Reynolds, supra note 178.
451. Juanita Darling, Mexico to Quit FMnd that Goes After U.S. Firns, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 1993, at D3. A bank controlled by the Mexican government held a 25% share
of an investment fund that openly planned to buy U.S. companies and move their op-
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The Mexican government has attempted to move out of some of these
industries, but as yet is still involved to a high degree in many indus-
tries. 2 A privatization effort to remove the Mexican government from
various industries began in early 1982 under the de la Madrid administra-
tion."" As part of President Salinas' current market reform efforts, Mex-
ico has attempted to privatize a number of businesses,"' but progress
has been slow and a large number of government controlled businesses
still exist." ' Furthermore, privatization of industries does not always
prove to promote efficient operation."' In addition, the changes often
move slowly given the large number of parties involved.' In negotiat-
ing NAFTA, Congress believed such issues were properly handled by the
Mexican government and that such concerns had "no place in trade ne-
gotiations." 1" However, as this belief is disproven, the concern contin-
erations into Mexico. Id. The fund, the AmeriMex Maquiladora Fund Limited Partner-
ship, planned to then resell the relocated companies after bolstering profits by lower-
ing wage costs. Id. The Mexican government withdrew from participation after a
vocal protest to such practice ensued in the Congress. Id. However, this is indicative
of how active the government is in economic participation as they were willing to
participate in such a fund even though such an arrangement might have put the
North American Free Trade Agreement in jeopardy. See id.
452. Siquerios, supra note 10, at 295. Until 1990, the Mexican government was in-
volved in the telephone industry, Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., the steel sector,
Sidermex, S.A., and mining concerns, Capania Minera de Cananea, S.A., to name a
few. Id.
453. Rubio, supra note 192, at 237 n.5.
454. Interestingly, this move to sell off state-owned businesses has made "winners"
of U.S. investors. Dentzer, supra note 173. United States investors can obtain good
deals by "purchas[ing] formerly state-owned companies" in Mexico. Id.
455. As of February 1992, the Mexican government had only privatized some 921 of
the 1,115 state-owned companies. Espana, supra note 17. The move to privatize busi-
nesses resulted from an understanding that state money was being "soaked up by the
constant losses of state-owned enterprises." Naim, supra note 39, These losses were
due to the general understanding that "state support for industry promotes inefficien-
cy." CRistO, supra note 35, at 98.
456. For example, the "NAYIA-encouraged" effort, to privatize resulted in the private
ownership of toll roads in Mexico. Jones, supra note 191. In one result, the Mexico
City - Acapulco toll increased to a burdensome $80 for a six-hour trip. Id.
457. "The public bureaucracy, Congress, the courts, state and local governments,
political parties, labor unions, private sector organizations, and other interest groups
all get. involved in the process." Naim, supra note 39. The "technical nature" of such
changes also adds to the delay. Id.
458. TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES, supra note 53.
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ues that the Mexican government is in businesses and areas "where it
does not belong."'
There also exists an element of fear of "economic imperialism"
throughout the hemisphere."" This wariness has "plagued the resolution
of disputes arising in inter-American commercial transactions.""' Other
Western countries have been hesitant to adopt American legal precepts,
some arguing that to do so would amount to "ethnocentric cultural impe-
rialism."'- There is a general feeling that the United States does not suf-
ficiently appreciate or understand the Mexican culture or society."
This is extremely significant as a primary reason for conflict in interna-
tional trade is a lack of understanding about "the nations, cultures and
individuals with which we deal."'
Some Mexican opponents of NAFTA have argued that the major thrust
of NAFTA, to increase trade among Mexico and the United States is
merely the "latest attempt to exercise political hegemony over Mexi-
co. '"' Some in Mexico fear increased trade will result in an intrusion
on Mexico's sovereignty."' In light of all these facts, an American busi-
nessperson must not rush headlong into a business deal in Mexico, but
must instead consider and weigh all the benefits and risks associated
with such trade.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Private Parties Should Proceed With a Degree of Caution
A common feature of international commercial contracts is the "ever-
459. DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, supra note 15, at 8.
460. The Resurgence of Democracy in Latin. America, supra note 210. In light of
this fact, nations naturally attempt to protect their sovereignty. Id. A necessary aspect
of sovereignty is the states "ability to devise policies, laws, and regulations affecting
foreign trade and investment." Id.
461. H.R. REP. No. 501, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990). In fact, a large measure of
why the United States become party to the linlter-American Convention was the previ-
ous rejection of joining international conventions by the Latin American countries. Id.
The United States felt that joining a regional agreement might lessen the trepidation.
Id.
462. See generally Michael Ross Fowler & Julie M. Bunck, Legal Imperialism or
Disinterested Assistance? American Legal Aid in the Caribbean Basin, 55 ALB. L.
REV. 815 (1992).
463. See generally Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-
Trade Issues in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 391 (1993).
464. Dress, supra note 312, at 571.
465. Fitch, supra note 35, at 377.
466. Id. at 377-78.
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growing number of instances" where problems threaten contract perfor-
mance. "7 Disputes frequently involve a state or state entity and a pri-
vate party.4" Various sources exist describing how arbitration can less-
en or remove such problems or disputes. ' Yet, even when drafting a
well-crafted arbitration clause or agreement, the private businessperson
must always remember the social, political, and historical differences
that have highlighted the United States-Mexican relation.' These dif-
ferences make trade disputes and tension almost "inevitable.'' Thus,
the American businessman should cultivate an "awareness" of the Mexi-
can culture and system if expecting to operate successfully."'
1. International Commercial Arbitration not a Panacea
Historically, Latin American countries generally disfavor arbitration.'""
The benefits of international commercial arbitration are well-known in
the Western industrialized world and thought to be desirable in most
instances.7 The acceptance of international commercial arbitration as
the means of dispute settlement in developing countries, such as Mexico,
was seen to rest merely on "educating the governments and business and
legal circles" to the advantages of arbitration.' In many respects, de-
veloping countries have accepted the suitability of arbitration for general
467. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION 18 (1983).
468. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 224, at v.
469. For example, the Guide to Arbitration presents, in different languages, the ways
by which a party can make use of the International Chamber of Commerce arbitra-
tion process. GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, supra note 467, at 9. The Guide provides the
wording necessary to allow for intervention by a third party. Id.; see also Jean
Heilman Grier, Providing For Dispute Settlement in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS 775 (PLI Litig. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 789, 1992).
470. Anderson & Grossman, supra note 323, at 191 (noting "a history of conflict
between north and south, widely varying intellectual and cultural traditions, and nu-
merous differences").
471. Fitch, supra note 35, at 354 n.8 (citing SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, A MARRIAGE OF
CONVENIENCE: RELATIONS BETWEEN MEXICO AND TIlE UNITED STATES 69-72 (1990)).
472. See generally John M. Bruton, A Different Culture: Cultural Considerations in
Doing Business in Mexico, DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO: VOLUME 1 2-1 (Susan K. Lefler
1987).
473. TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND STATE CONTRACTS, sutpra note 369, at 81. See
also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 224, at 6 (region traditionally "hostile to com-
mercial arbitration").
474. RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES TIIROUGII INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 284-85
(Thomas E. Carbonneau ed. 1984).
475. Id. at 285-86.
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commercial transactions yet remain reluctant to apply arbitration in situ-
ations involving important government objectives."' However, there still
remains a general movement toward using arbitration in Mexico, espe-
cially among "Mexican entrepreneurs" who are open to the benefits of
international trade. 7
The most important requirement is to establish an agreement by the
parties that the dispute will be handled by arbitration, and this remains
the "foundation stone of modern international commercial arbitra-
tion."4 7' This agreement establishes that the parties have consented to
the arbitration process.' Consent is critical, because without it, "there
can be no valid arbitration.""
The best means to provide for arbitration is to draft an arbitration
agreement or clause. 8 ' Two general objectives should be sought: (1) to
draft the arbitration agreement or clause to handle the particular needs
of the situation and (2) the clause or agreement must be clear and un-
ambiguous. 2 The drafting parties should attempt to make their under-
standing clear, as an arbitrator generally will respect their intentions. 4''
Of particular concern is the proper drafting of an effective arbitration
clause or agreement. The drafting must be done with particular specifici-
ty as it presents a "trap for the unwary."'s Giving adequate consider-
ation and time to the arbitration clause or agreement is critical. This is
especially true since the arbitration clause or agreement is seldom a key
element of the business deal and many times becomes the "last item
discussed" before finalization of the deal. ' While an agreement to arbi-
trate can be embodied in a distinct and separate instrument from the
business contract, the insertion of a well-drafted arbitration clause in the
business contract will suffice.
476. Id. at 286.
477. 2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: Mexico-3 (Albert Jan
Van Den Berg ed. 1984).
478. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 224, at 3.
479. Id. at 4.
480. Id.
481. Camp, Jr., supra note 223, at 734.
482. Id.
483. 2A SMIT & PECIIOTA, supra note 236, at 2833.
484. Fagan & Arreola, supra note 30, at 818. The person drafting an international
business deal should not become overly consumed by the details of the deal and
forget the arbitration clause. "There is an astonishing contrast between the degree of
sophistication reflected in the substance of some voluminous international contracts,
prepared by highly competent and resourceful personnel, and the primitiveness of the
error to be found in the arbitration clause." Id. 818-19 (quoting W. LAWRENCE CRAIG
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 160 (1990)).
485. Robert Coulson. Survey of International Commercial Arbitration Prvcedures,
in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION KIT 159, 159 (1981).
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a. Arbitration clause48'
In all international business contracts, arbitration clauses can be de-
signed to reduce risk."7 Most importantly, they are useful in reducing
uncertainty, the factor that the businessperson fears "above almost all
other risks of doing business."'" It is now common practice to insert
arbitration clauses in most any kind of international transaction."' The
arbitration clause, if properly drafted, can have application to a variety of
situations.2"' As the "essential prerequisite" to arbitration, the arbitration
clause must specify an agreement to arbitrate." If done properly, all
the benefits of international arbitration are available to the
businessperson. 2
b. Arbitration clause when dealing with a state or state entity
Specific reasons exist for using an arbitration clause when operating
under a state contract.4 0 Private parties harbor uncertainty about being
subject to the co-contracting state's jurisdiction. The contracting state is
generally not amenable to suit in another state's jurisdiction.9 In many
developing countries, where the government is actively involved in the
economy, international arbitration stands as the preferred method of dis
pute resolution. " Contracts between private parties and state entities
"almost invariably" use an arbitration clause. 9 The arbitration clause
486. "A clause inserted in a contract providing for compulsory arbitration in case of
dispute as to rights or liabilities under such contract . . . . The purpose of such
clause is to avoid having to litigate disputes that might arise." BLACK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 105 (6th ed. 1990). An arbitration clause is known as "clausula compromisoria"
in Mexico. Siquerios, supra note 10. at 321.
487. The mere use of a dispute resolution clause often can "de-escalate tensions"
when a deal has fallen apart. Dress, supra note 312, at 571.
488. Camp, Jr., supra note 223, at 725.
489. For example, "transnational contracts for the sale of goods, licensing or trans-
fer of technology, loans of funds, and joint investment of capital" often contain arbi-
tration clauses. RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487 reporter's
Note 1 (1987).
490. Camp, Jr., supra note 223, at 739-51.
491. RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487 cmt. d. (1987).
492. Danilowicz, supra note 222, at 237.
493. TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND STATE CONTRACTS, supra note 369, at 80.
494. Id. Insertion of an arbitration clause shows the will to "internationalize" the
contract, removing it from the jurisdictions of the contracting parties. Id.
495. AKSEN & MEIIREN, supra note 387, at 17.
496. Id.
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finds regular use in such cases.11 7 The arbitration clause remains a key
tool in obtaining a degree of certainty in dealing with a state or state en
tity because attempts made by States to avoid the consequences of arbi-
tration clauses are not well received by arbitrators."
The use of an arbitration clause may preclude assertion of the sover-
eignty defense or Act of State doctrine. As a general proposition of inter-
national law, a state may waive its sovereign immunity either expressly
or by implication."' Under United States law" and as an emerging
principle of international law, an agreement to arbitrate acts as a waiver
to sovereign immunity."1 Generally, as opposed to the sovereignty de-
fense, the Act of State doctrine can not be waived.0 2 However, a valid
arbitration clause will indicate the state party has acknowledged it is
operating in the "international arena" and subject to international norms.
Thus, justification for application of the Act of State doctrine is less-
ened. " To provide additional support to this argument, the private par-
ty should specifically request a waiver of immunity by the State or State
entity?" Specific wording requesting such a waiver can be included in
the business contract."'
497. The arbitration of disputes is used often in "contracts with state-owned entities.
whether in market, centrally-planned, or developing economies .... " RESTATEMENT
(TIi[RD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 487 reporter's note 1 (1987).
498. Id.
499. RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 456(1) (1987).
500. Various cases hold that an agreement to arbitrate acts as a waiver of sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Maritime Int'i Nominees v. Republic of Guinea, 505 F. Supp. 141,
143 (D.D.C. 1981); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya,
482 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (D.D.C. 1980); Ipitrade Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
465 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D.D.C. 1978). This principle is also codified in the FSIA: "A
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States . . . in any case in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1988). See supra notes 388-99
and accompanying text for discussion of FSIA.
501. See generally RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 456 reporter's
note 3. (1987); Gary B. Sullivan, Implicit Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by Consent
to Arbitration: Ter)itorial Scope and Procedural Limits, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 329 (1983).
502. RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 443 cmt. e. (1987). The Act
of State doctrine rests on "judicial self-restraint." and as such can not be waived by
a foreign state. Id.
503. Id.
504. AKSEN & MEIIREN, supra note 387, at 351.
505. Such language may read as follows:
The government agrees that this arbitration clause is an explicit waiver of
immunity against enforcement and execution of the Award or any judgment
thereon and that the Award or judgement thereon, if unsatisfied, shall be en-
forceable against the government in the courts of any nation in accordance
with its laws.
Id. at 357. See also Beverly May Carl, Suhg Foreign Governments in United States
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c. Drafting properly
To perform effectively, an arbitration clause must be well drafted. To
do so, the clause must be drafted to specifically speak to the four differ-
ent persons involved in the arbitration process:
It must speak first to the parties who are negotiating the contract the clause will
govern, then to the arbitrators who will resolve disputes under the authority of
that clause. While an arbitration is taking place, it must speak to the judges of
courts that might interfere with those arbitrators; and finally, when the arbitrators
render their award, the clause must speak to the judges of courts that will enforce
it.
r m
Generally, the language must indicate the solemn nature of the arbitra-
tion clause and the responsibilities imposed upon the parties."7 The
clause must also indicate the unqualified authority of the arbitrator to re
solve disputes." Third, the clause must adequately convey to judges
that the arbitration proceeding should not be interfered with.' Finally
the clause must indicate an expectation that the judgment as rendered by
the arbitrators will be enforced."' Although a daunting task, a drafts-
man may address all of there concerns if he spends time addressing all
the scenarios that might occur. In other words, the draftsman must "de-
vise a legal system that will sustain the arbitration clause in every juris-
diction in which it is likely to be tested.""t As a means of accomplish-
ing this, the New York Convention and Inter-American Convention, the
two sources that NAFTA references, are the most applicable textual
models."'
The clause should also be drafted with the understanding that termi-
nology might be different in the United States and Mexico. In fact, in the
context of contract law, United States and Mexican terminology differ
Courts: The U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Pr ctice, in DOING BUSINESS IN
MEXICO 7-40 to 7-41 (Edward L. Newberger ed., 1974) (providing additional example of
waiver clause).
506. Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., How to Droft a Transnational Arbitration Clause: Th7e
Four Languages of" Chaes V, in CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL AL-
TERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3.002 (William A. Hancock ed., 1993).
507. Id. at 3.003.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 3.004.
511. Id. at 3.004 - .005.
512. They provide "the draftman's readiest tools for planning the worldwide enforce-
ability of a transnational arbitration clause." Id. at 3.005.
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markedly."' Thus, the drafter must cautiously select the appropriate ter-
minology to fulfill the intention of the parties and lead to enforcement of
both the agreement and the award."'
All of these concerns become more pressing when dealing with a state
or state enterprise. In such cases, arbitration clauses must be "phrased
much more carefully and clearly."" '1 To do so requires more research
than when dealing with a private party. " Also, the party should realize
that arbitration tends to be slower when dealing with a state enterprise
and that patience should be exercised."'
d. Technicalities
The arbitration agreementf"' should generally be in writing"" and
513. HERGERT & CAMIII., supra note 343, at 41.
514. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 224, at 116. For example. in determining what
matters the arbitration agreement will pertain to, the United States and England,
though sharing a common language, have different interpretations. In England, using
the words "claims", "difference", and "disputes" would bring in the most matters for
consideration under arbitration. Id. However, in the United States, "controversies"
would capture the most issues for resolution by arbitration. Id. These types of con-
cerns could only be amplified between the United States, an English speaking country
and Mexico, a Spanish speaking country.
515. BOCKsTIEGEL, supra note 340, at 51. The drafter must provide for typical con-
cerns, but also "insure that it is binding on the sovereign state and will not be sty-
mied by a defense of sovereign immunity." AKSEN & MEIIREN, supra note 387, at 60.
516. See BOCKSTIEGEL, supra note 340, at 52. Before drafting an arbitration clause
with a state or state enterprise, the party should be fully cognizant of the activities
of the state or state enterprise and make sure to detenine that the person with
whom they are dealing is authorized to act on its behalf. See id. To prevent asser-
tion that the party entering the deal did not have State authority to do so, the draft-
er can add the following to the arbitration clause: "Each party affirms that it has full
legal authority to enter into the obligations which they undertake in this contract,
including the full legal authority to enter into this arbitration agreement." AKEN &
MEItREN, supra note 387, at 358.
517. BOCKSTIEGEL, supra note 340, at 52-53. To speed up the process, the procedure
of arbitration should be clearly established. Id.
518. An arbitration agreement differs from an arbitration clause. An arbitration
agreement is the manifestation of assent by the parties to place the matter before
arbitration. "'Arbitration agreement' is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbi-
tration all or certain disputes which have arisen or may arise between them in re-
spect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not." UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARI3TRATION. art. 7(1) (U.N. Comm'n on Int'l
Trade Law 1985). In contrast, an arbitration clause can be a basis for an arbitration
agreement. "An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause or
in the form of a separate agreement." Id.
519. The New York Convention provides recognition of an "agreement in writing."
New York Convention, suipro note 269, at Article II. The Inter-American Convention
speaks of an "instrument signed by the parties." Inter-American Convention, supra
note 289, at Article 1. Clarity in writing requires considerable thought since the
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signed by the parties, but other means exist to obtain a valid agree-
ment.' " The validity of the arbitration agreement must be established,
for if there is a deficiency, a subsequent arbitration award need not be
enforced.2' However, the drafter should find some solace in the fact
that the "formal requirements" for a valid arbitration agreement will be
tested by reference to the New York and Inter-American Conventions,
not by differing national law.'-'
Arbitration clauses should generally be incorporated directly into the
commercial agreement." The clause can also be incorporated by refer-
ence.12' However, it has generally been held that some degree of ac-
knowledgement or acquiescence is required to bind both parties to arbi-
clause or agreement will likely be in Spanish as well as English. Camp, Jr., supra
note 223, at 735. Particular words, their denotation and connotation, must be exam-
ined to ensure that there is consistency in the two languages.
520. Under the New York Convention, parties can satisfy the "agreement in writing"
requirement through an "exchange of letters or telegrams." New York Convention,
supra note 269, at Article 1I (2). The Inter-American Convention is satisfied by "an
exchange of letters, telegrams, or telex communications." Inter-American Convention,
supra note 289, at Article 1. See also RESTATEMENT (ThIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 487 cmt. d. (1987).
521. An award obtained under an arbitration agreement "not meeting the require-
ments of the Convention may be valid ...but enforcement of such an award is not
required by the Convention." RESTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487
Cmt. d. (1987).
522. 1 SMIT & PECIIOTA, supra note 236, at 27.
523. RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487 reporter's note 3
(1987). This is the method of choice whereby the arbitration clause is "itself part of
an ordinary commercial contract." REIFERN & HIINTER, supra note 224, at 112.
524. RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW sect. 487 (1987). Black's Law
Dictionary defines incorporation by reference as:
The method of making one document of any kind become a part of another
separate document by referring to the former in the latter, and declaring that
the former shall be taken and considered as a part of the latter the same as
it were fully set out therein.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 767 (6th ed. 1990).
In this setting, an agreement to arbitrate incorporated by reference has heen held
effective if the parties have "roughly comparable bargaining strength" and have dealt
with each other in the past. RESTATEMENT (TIIII)) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487
reporter's note 3 (1987).
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tration. 5 ' The power to arbitrate a dispute is "derived from and based
on the agreement of the parties."1
6
e. Additional elements
Typically, an arbitration clause should contain the following: (1) an
agreement to submit to arbitration all or a defined set of disputes that
could arise under the contract, (2) an settled place of arbitration and (3)
procedures for the appointment of arbitrators. ' Many arbitration claus-
es contain additional matters.' Regardless of what one decides to in-
clude in the clause, if the agreement to arbitrate can be shown to be
"unequivocal," the clause will generally be held effective, despite missing
terms. 12
The businessperson should not feel overwhelmed or confused by the
number of matters that could be included in an arbitration agreement or
clause. Many institutions exist which provide valuable assistance in this
task.' Additionally, many articles have been written that help in ad-
dressing these particular concerns."1 Attempting to outline all the possi-
ble scenarios or difficulties that could arise in a business relationship is
525. See RESTATEMENT (TI[IRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487 reporter's note 3
(1987). Confirming orders sent by one party but unsigned and unreturned by the
receiver has generally been held not to create an agreement to arbitrate, even if the
underlying contract has proceeded. Id.
526. Danilowicz, supra note 222, at 250.
527. RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487 reporter's note 3
(1987).
528. Id. For example. "the language in which the arbitration is to be conduct-
ed; ... the law to govern the arbitration and/or the contract; and . . . conduct of
the arbitration under the rules of a specified arbitral institution." Id. For a discussion
of these matters, see Camp, Jr., supra note 223, at 734-39.
529. RESTATEMENT (TIoRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487. reporter's note 3
(1987). "In general, issue of applicable law, procedure, language, and place of arbitra-
tion can be resolved by the arbitrators; if the agreement fails to provide for the
method of selection of arbitrators, a court can appoint the arbitrators or direct their
appointment." Id.
530. For example, the businessman can look to the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), one of the world's largest arbitral institutions handling international disputes
for guidance. Ronald A. Brand, American Arbitration Association International Arbi-
tration Rules, I.E.L. VIII-E-5 (July 1991). This institution will assist in initiating arbi-
tration proceedings, providing and appointing arbitrators, giving technical expertise to
facilitate the process, assist in general administration of the arbitration proceedings,
and communicating the award to the interested parties. Id. If the parties can not
agree on the "details", the AAA will held to "fill the gaps." Id.
531. See, e.g., Robert Coulson et al., Choosing A Forum For International Commer-
cial Arbitration, 76 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 166 (1982); Filip De Ly, The Place of
Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of hIternational Commercial Arbitration: An
Exercise in Arbitration Planning, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 48 (1991).
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difficult, so the arbitration clause or agreement should be drafted broadly
to bring in as much as possible."'2 Sources exist that assist the drafter
in considering the most important issues to include in the arbitration
clause or agreement."' As a final matter, the clause should attempt to
bring in all the matters and procedures that the parties involved believe
will be or could be significant.' "[Ilt is essential that the arbitration
clause give the arbitrators as much authority as the parties intend."" A
properly drafted arbitration agreement or clause is the first step in add-
ing certainty to an international business deal. An American businessper-
532. Camp, Jr., supra note 223, at 735. This source favors the following language:
"Any dispute or controversy or claim arising out of or in connection with or relating
to this contract, or breach or termination or invalidity thereof, shall be finally settled
by arbitration." Id.
533. Fagan & Arreola, supra note 30, at 811-12. This source indicates answering the
following questions help in determining the controlling authority in arbitration of com-
mercial disputes between Mexico and the United States:
(1) Was there a contract in writing?, (2) If the contract had a choice-of-law
clause, what law did it specify?, (3) If the choice-of-law clause specified
[United States law], does that choice of law also include [United States] law
on conflicts of law, (4) Was the transaction covered by the United Nations
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), and, if so, does it
matter?, (5) Is the question to be decided a matter of substance or proce-
dure?, (6) Did the contract have an arbitration clause, and, if so, did it speci-
fy the rules to be followed in the arbitration proceeding, (7) If the contract
had a choice-of-law clause, did the same choice of law apply to both the
substance of the contract and the arbitration clause?, (8) If the contract is
found to be invalid but the arbitration clause enforceable, what law controls,
(9) At what point in the arbitration process do the following questions arise:
is a party resisting arbitration; is a party to an ongoing arbitration asking for
ancillary relief from the court; or is a party trying to enforce or overturn an
arbitration award?
Id. at 811-12.
The CISG governs the buyer's rights and seller's rights and duties when the par-
ties fail to provide for choice of law in their sales contract. United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980). Both Mexico
and the United States are parties to the convention. Id.
534. This is necessary because an arbitral tribunal possesses only limited powers.
RALSTON. supra note 70, at 43. The clause itself must define the powers and proce-
dures that pertain to the arbitral tribunal. Id. "An arbitration agreement does not
merely serve to evidence the consent of the parties to arbitration and to establish
the obligation to arbitrate. It is also the basic source of the powers of the arbitral
tribunal." REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 224, at 5.
535. INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3.011 (William A. Hancock ed.
1993).
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son attempting trade with Mexico should devote considerable time and
effort to this essential element of an international business transaction.
VII. CONCLUSION
The inevitable expansion in world trade will result in "increasing inter-
actions between nations."' NArFTA encourages, and rightly so, the in-
crease of trade and business between the United States and Mexico. As a
natural result, increasing trade disputes will likely result. Alternative dis-
pute resolution is the most effective means of resolving such conflicts
without one party becoming subject to another party's national court
system, which may be unfamiliar, slow, and expensive."
When American businesses desire to engage in trade with Mexico, they
must understand the unique problems and issues that arise in such busi-
ness dealings.' Businesses should, at a minimum, become aware of the
differences of the two legal systems existing in the United States and
Mexico.' Great opportunities exist to increase trade with Mexico due
to the passage of NAFTA. American businesses should avail themselves
of such opportunities while taking into account the risks involved, and
with the understanding that such risks can be minimized if proceeding
with caution and knowledge.
The provisions provided for in NAIFTA provide "no guarantee" that ev
erything will be settled out of court."' The methods envisioned by
NAFTA remain a voluntary and consensual process, and are always de-
pendent on the parties involved abiding by their obligations. In addition,
to be effective, the national governments must also honor their commit-
ments." However, as this Comment has attempted to explain, the more
536. WINIIAM, supra note 34, at 131.
537. Camp, Jr., supra note 223, at 751.
538. Fagan & Arreola, supra note 30, at 820. The business transaction will occur
between "people who come from different cultures, do not speak the same language,
and are accustomed to totally different legal systems." Id.
539. "Mexico ...and the United States have fundamentally different legal systems."
Fitch, supra note 35. at 387.
540. Coulson, supra note 531, at 167. For example, the party against whom an
arbitration award is rendered may make appeals to the national court systems to
delay enforcement of the award. See. e.g., Parsons & Whitemore Overseas Co. v.
Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 978 (1974) (noting use of
,numerous defenses to enforcement of the arbitral award").
541. In the past, States have "always" had an interest in the resolution of disputes
within their boundaries and thus were likely to become involved. Danilowicz, supra
note 222, at 257. However, with the increased level of international trade, states have
begun to realize that "national intervention hampers business transactions." Id. As
such, if nations are to benefit from this increased world trade, it is likely that. they
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matters and issues that can be tied down at the outset of the contract or
business deal, the better the chances that the dispute settlement tech-
niques chosen will work as intended.
JONATHAN I. MILLER
will remove themselves from the process.
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